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ABSTRACT 
SCOTT C. O’BRIEN: Alienation, Ambivalence, and Scorekeepers: Three Essays on Public 
Opinion Formation in American Politics 
(Under the direction of Thomas M. Carsey) 
 
This dissertation is composed of three chapters, each of which explores public opinion 
formation in American politics: 
The first chapter, titled “Polarization, Alienation, and Trust in Government,” introduces 
perceived polarization (the ideological distance a citizen perceives between the parties) and ideological 
alienation (the perceived ideological distance between a citizen and the closest party) as process-
oriented predictors of trust in government. Using the American National Election Studies 
(ANES) Cumulative Data File, I find that polarization and alienation both explain trust. I find 
that these relationships are robust across both time and trust measures.  
The second chapter, “Left Behind: Competitive Nominations and Comparative 
Candidate Ambivalence,” investigates comparative candidate ambivalence (simultaneously holding 
positive attitudes toward competing general election candidates) as a possible competitive 
nomination carryover effect on thwarted voters. I draw on motivated reasoning theory to argue 
that unlike other groups, thwarted voters should gather positive information about both party 
nominees during the general election due to (1) “sour grapes” toward their party; and (2) party 
loyalty-driven pressure to support their party nominee. I test my theory in the context of the 
competitive 2008 Democratic nomination contest between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. 
Using the 2008-09 ANES Panel Study, I investigate differences in cross-sectional and 
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longitudinal ambivalence between Clinton voters and five other electoral groups. My results are 
promising, but limited due to low group sample sizes.  
The third chapter, “Who Are the Scorekeepers? Sophisticated Independents and 
Economic Perceptions,” attempts to validate Stimson’s (2004) theory that there is a small group 
of politically well-informed but non-partisan citizens who evaluate the economy objectively. I 
operationalize these “scorekeepers” as politically sophisticated independents and divide the 
ANES sample into four groups: in-partisans, out-partisans, unsophisticated independents, and 
sophisticated independents. On the micro level, I find evidence that partisans’ economic 
retrospections are biased relative to independents’ retrospections. On the macro level, I find that 
independents mirror the retrospections sample mean particularly well, but partisans are biased. 
Lastly, I compare each group’s predicted probabilities of several retrospection responses across 
Gross Domestic Product growth levels and find that sophisticated independents’ retrospections 
are most responsive to objective economic conditions. 
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I. POLARIZATION, ALIENATION, AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
 
Political trust reflects the perceived competence, fairness, and responsiveness of government. It 
measures the public’s confidence in government to do what is right as well as perceptions of 
how efficient, corrupt, and wasteful it is. Scholars regard trust as a vital sign of a democracy’s 
health (Dahl 1971; Hetherington 2005). They generally agree that trust is necessary to legitimize 
government policies, promote citizen compliance with the law, and maintain regime stability 
(Gamson 1968; Barber 1983; Tyler 1990). Without sufficient trust, government must resort to 
coercive practices to ensure its decisions are accepted and implemented (Levi 1997). Political 
observers worry that low trust diminishes political participation. While limited distrust toward 
government may be healthy in a deliberative democracy (Barber 1983; Warren 1999), if trust 
vanishes altogether, so might the regime (Easton 1965; Gamson 1968; Hetherington 1998; 
Hardin 1999).  
Political observers expressed anxiety about the consequences of a well-documented 
erosion of trust following the civil rights movement, Watergate, and Vietnam War and again 
after trust unexpectedly plummeted in the early 1990s (e.g., Abramson 1983; Lipset & Schneider 
1987; Miller & Borelli 1991; Craig 1996; Orren 1997; Citrin & Luks 2001; Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse 2001). Declining trust, they argue, potentially leads to concomitant reductions in voter 
turnout, grassroots lobbying, and other means of political participation (Hibbing & Theiss-
Morse 2002). Therefore, it is important to understand the causes of trust. 
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In this paper, I propose and test two potential influences on trust attitudes: The first is 
perceived polarization -- the ideological gap citizens perceive between the major political parties. 
Observers have noted increasing separation of what V.O. Key (1964) termed “the parties in 
government” and “the parties as organizations” along the traditional left-right ideological 
spectrum. Since 1980, the Democratic Party has become more liberal and the Republican Party 
has become more conservative, all else equal (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz 2006). To date, only 
limited scholarly work has investigated a possible relationship between polarization and trust. 
Though some argue that polarization has driven voters (especially moderates) away from 
political engagement, this conclusion is more anecdotally than empirically-supported (see King 
1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2001; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 2006; Hetherington 2008). This 
paper more rigorously investigates whether the ideological gap citizens perceive between the 
parties has meaningful impacts on trust attitudes.1 
The second potential determinant of trust I investigate is ideological alienation from the 
major political parties.2 I define ideological alienation as the Euclidian distance between citizens’ 
ideological self-placement and their placement of the nearest political party. Political scientists 
have primarily investigated ideological alienation from candidates as an explanation for low 
election turnout levels; the more ideological distance between a citizen and the closest political 
party, the more likely he or she is to abstain from voting (Zipp 1985; Adams & Merrill 2003; 
Plane & Gershtenson 2004). In this paper, I make the case that ideological alienation from the 
parties may explain trust attitudes as well. 
                                                 
1 I analyze perceived polarization because citizens’ perceptions of polarization should drive their trust attitudes 
regardless of what is actually happening to the parties. Polarization exists in a citizen’s mind only to the extent that 
he or she perceives ideological distance between the parties. In other words, perceptions should drive trust attitudes. 
 
2 This should not be confused with the more vaguely defined concept of “political alienation” explored by the 
sociology literature in the 1970s. I am solely concerned with spatial distance between citizens and the parties. 
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In what follows, I use the American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative file to 
test a model incorporating both perceived polarization and ideological alienation as predictors of 
trust. I proceed as follows: First, I review the existing literature on trust, polarization, and 
alienation as well as their limited intersections. Next, I formally define the key concepts in my 
analysis, lay out the theoretical reasoning behind my expected findings, and develop testable 
hypotheses. Then, I discuss my model, data, and estimation methods. Finally, I report my results 
and reach several substantive conclusions about them. 
 
The Framework of Trust 
David Easton’s (1965) seminal work on political institutions defines trust as a form of 
support -- the evaluative inclination citizens hold toward political systems. He delineates two 
aspects of political systems that determine the level of trust the citizenry has in government: 
Specific support captures “attitudes toward an institution based on the fulfillment of demands for 
particular policies or actions” (Easton 1965, 273). Such support is derived from the actions of 
policymakers. Thus, it is the type of support captured by performance variables such as 
presidential approval. Easton argues that distrust toward the authorities can be remedied easily 
through electoral replacement. As a result, it has been of less concern to scholars than the other 
component, diffuse support. 
Diffuse support refers to a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill that helps 
members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they 
see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965, 273). This type of support comes from the 
reverence an institution elicits and the responsiveness of the political process, independent of 
those in power. As a result, it tends to remain more stable than specific support over time. 
Scholars are more concerned with diffuse distrust than specific distrust because it has more 
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serious implications for democracy – since it cannot be remedied through electoral replacement, 
it could potentially fester over time and eventually threaten a regime’s existence.  
As a result of Easton’s work, the literature on trust in government has evolved around 
the diffuse (process-oriented) and specific (performance-oriented) support framework. Scholars 
used it to debate the ramifications of a major decline in trust during the late 1960s and early 
1970s. On one side, Miller (1974a; 1974b) argued that the decline was institutional and hence the 
effects were serious and likely to endure without significant institutional changes. Conversely, 
Citrin (1974) claimed the decline stemmed from performance evaluations and not the 
institutions of government more broadly. Therefore, the effects were less serious because they 
were correctable via electoral replacement of incumbents.  
Trust research has focused on performance-oriented causes of trust (Nye 1997). 
Presidential and, in particular, congressional approval powerfully predict trust (Feldman 1983; 
Williams 1985; Citrin & Green 1986; Erber & Lau 1990; Craig 1993; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 
1995; Hetherington 1998, Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn 2000; Citrin & Luks 2001). Scandals and 
perceived government corruption decrease trust (Garment 1991; Orren 1997; Pew 1998). 
Another powerful factor is national economic performance, economic perceptions (Citrin & 
Green 1986; Weatherford 1987; Miller & Borrelli 1991; Lawrence 1997; Hetherington 1998; 
Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn 2000; Citrin & Luks 2001; Hetherington & Rudolph 2008), and to a 
lesser degree, personal economic problems such as unemployment (Nye & Zelikow 1997). 
Finally, research indicates that declining trust can be attributed in part to moral discontent with 
social ills such as crime and poverty (Craig 1993; Mansbridge 1997; Hetherington 1998; Pew 
1998).  
Despite these established performance-oriented causes, the fact that the decline in trust 
has persisted across decades of government turnover indicates that there are likely unidentified 
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process-oriented influences at work. In one of the few research efforts to tackle these influences, 
Keele (2007) found a positive over-time macro-level relationship between social capital and 
trust. To date, no work has attempted to isolate individual-level process-oriented explanations of 
trust. I propose and test two such potential explanations in this paper. 
 
Party Polarization  
The decline in trust in the early 1990s lacked any obvious explanation such as a poor 
economy or an unpopular war or scandal, so scholars directed new energy toward better 
understanding trust. At about the same time, they became normatively concerned about party 
polarization and its effects on democracy. In simple terms, party polarization is the ideological 
gap between the parties. The scholarly consensus is that beginning in the 1980s, the parties in 
government and parties as organizations began polarizing. The trend was exemplified by the 
Newt Gingrich-led Republican takeover of Congress in 1994 that resulted in a government 
shutdown after severe partisan bickering.  
The bulk of the work on institutional polarization has focused on Congress (see Layman 
& Carsey 2002). In particular, studies have implicated the partisan realignment of the South 
(Rohde 1991; Hood, Kidd, & Morris 1999; Jacobson 2000; Weisberg 2002), increasing 
ideological dissimilarity between, and homogeneity within, parties in Congress (Abramowitz & 
Saunders 1998; Hood, Kidd, & Morris 1999; Jacobson 2000; 2005; Weisberg 2002; Fleisher & 
Bond 2004), changing demographics of congressional districts and the American public, and 
increasing party activist influence as causes of congressional party polarization (McCarty, Poole, 
& Rosenthal 1997; Gimpel 1999; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani 2003; Oppenheimer 2005; 
Layman et al. 2010). A second line of research has found evidence of increased partisanship in 
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party leadership, strategy, and rules within Congress (Rohde 1991; Cox & McCubbins 1993; 
Sinclair 1995; 2000; Snyder & Groseclose 2000; Theriault 2006).  
The evidence for polarization in the electorate is mixed; however, the balance of research 
suggests that the public has also become more deeply divided in recent decades, but not to the 
same degree as elites have (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson 1996; Levine, Carmines, & Huckfeldt 
1997; Abramowitz & Saunders 1998; Jacobson 2000; 2005; Fleisher & Bond 2001; Layman & 
Carsey 2002; Weisberg 2002; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani 2003). However, Fiorina, Abrams, & 
Pope (2006) caution that the degree to which the parties have polarized in the electorate is 
significantly overstated in the academic and popular literature. They argue that while the political 
class has polarized in recent years, most citizens have remained relatively moderate. Layman, 
Carsey, & Horowitz (2006) and Abramowitz & Saunders (2008) respond that Fiorina, Abrams, 
& Pope’s (2006) findings, while important, still reveal statistically significant separation of the 
parties in the electorate since 1980, particularly with regard to issue positions on abortion and 
homosexuality.  
 
Ideological Alienation  
Political alienation can be broadly defined as the degree of estrangement one feels from 
the political process. It came into vogue as a sociological research topic during the early 1970s in 
the aftermath of massive social and political unrest over race relations, Watergate, and the 
Vietnam War. Sociologists feared that these socially traumatic events would isolate the public 
from the political process. Their work often treated government distrust and political efficacy as 
the primary indicators of alienation (see Aberbach 1969; Miller 1974a, Miller 1974b; Citrin 1974; 
Macke 1979; Rahn, Kroeger, & Kite 1996). Meanwhile, a separate and substantial body of work 
in political science’s spatial modeling literature conceptualized alienation as the ideological 
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distance between a citizen and the closest candidate (e.g., Davis, Hinich, & Ordeshook 1970; 
Brody & Page 1973; Enelow & Hinich 1984). Ideological alienation is distinct from sociologists’ 
conception of political alienation because, while both concepts purport to capture a feeling of 
isolation from the political system, ideological alienation is more narrowly focused on ideological 
distance from candidates (or, as in this case, parties) and more metrically precise (measured using 
Euclidean distance).3 
Research indicates that citizens are less likely to vote if they are alienated by ideologically 
distant candidates (e.g., Hinich & Ordeshook 1969; Hinich, Ledyard, & Ordeshook 1972; Zipp 
1985; Adams & Merrill 2003; Plane & Gershtenson 2004). In this context, alienation measures 
the linear distance from a citizen’s ideological self-placement to their placement of the nearest 
candidate (Plane & Gershtenson 2004). The smaller this distance, the less alienated the citizen is 
and the more likely he or she is to vote. The larger the distance, the more likely he or she is to 
abstain. The spatial modeling literature typically contrasts alienation with indifference, which is 
when both candidates are equidistant from the citizen. However, the predicted response is also 
abstention (Brody & Page 1973). Since ideological distance is a summary measure of many issue-
based distances, some might question whether it accurately captures voters’ electoral calculus.  
Hinich & Munger (1994) convincingly argue that the sheer number of electoral issues makes 
using individual issue assessments prohibitively demanding of cognitive resources for most 
voters. Therefore, a summary ideological distance measure accurately captures most voters’ 
assessment of their issue-based ideological proximity to candidates. 
Though the spatial modeling literature is replete with theoretical depictions of alienation 
and indifference, there is little empirical work that tests whether they affect actual voting 
behavior. One such example is Zipp (1985), who finds that alienation from and indifference 
                                                 
3 Alienation is such a murky concept in the sociology literature that it has spawned articles dedicated solely to 
determining its meaning and how it should be measured (e.g., Aberbach 1969). 
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toward perceived candidate issue positions affects the likelihood of voting in presidential 
elections from 1968-1980, with indifference exerting a significantly larger impact than alienation. 
Adams, Dow, & Merrill (2006) reinforce Zipp’s findings, modeling alienation and indifference as 
functions of non-policy variables and empirically testing a formal theory-driven turnout model. 
Plane & Gershtenson (2004) find similar results for both the probability of individual-level 
voting and for aggregate-level turnout in midterm Senate elections. 
To date, only one analysis has attempted to connect ideological alienation to citizens’ 
attitudes instead of voting behavior: King (1997) conceives of alienation as an individual-level 
impact of aggregate-level party polarization. He finds that those who distrust government tend 
to be the most ideologically distant from strong party identifiers. Building on this analysis, I 
measure ideological alienation from the parties (rather than candidates or strong party 
identifiers) to see if it improves our understanding of trust.  
 
How Polarization and Alienation Might Explain Trust 
There are several ways we might expect polarization to affect trust: First, it might impede 
government performance. Ostensibly, parties that find themselves on opposite ends of the 
ideological spectrum will have trouble moving legislation both in Congress and through the 
president. Parties in government will be less likely to compromise on policy outcomes. The 
result will be at worst complete gridlock or at best diminished policy output, resulting in 
perceptions of ineffective government (Hetherington 1998). We might therefore expect citizens 
to react to poor productivity by trusting government less to “do the right thing” since it is not 
doing much at all.  
Second, polarization may make the tone of political discourse bitter and divisive, causing 
citizens to lose faith in government. Citizens should find it hard to trust a government whose 
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leaders cannot engage in civil policy debates. As extreme ideologues shout at one another across 
an ever-widening ideological divide, citizens may start to become cynical about the government’s 
ability to construct reasoned policy. For example, in a Pew Research Center report, respondents 
listed the overly partisan nature of government as a prevailing reason they disliked it (Pew 1998). 
Moreover, experimental research has demonstrated that televised incivility leads to short-term 
declines in trust (Mutz & Reeves 2005; Forgette & Morris 2006). 
Alternatively, it is conceivable that polarization has the opposite effect on trust: Miller 
(1974a) worried in the 1970s that undifferentiated parties may leave citizens dissatisfied by the 
lack of clear alternatives, leading to distrust (Miller 1974a). It follows that clearly contrasting 
choices might make citizens more likely to engage in the political process, leading to higher trust 
(Hetherington 2001). It is also possible that citizens are comfortable with a certain degree of 
gridlock because it ensures that the consequences of policy proposals are carefully considered 
and that only centrist policies survive. Finally, polarization may build trust by ensuring that both 
sides are energetically represented in policy debates, bitter as they may be.  
Thus, I have theoretical support for both a negative and positive relationship between 
polarization and trust. As a result, I formulate two competing polarization hypotheses: First, my 
negative polarization hypothesis states that, all else equal, as perceived polarization increases, trust 
should decrease. Second, my positive polarization hypotheses states that, all else equal, as perceived 
polarization increases, trust should increase. This response should occur independently of the 
citizen’s ideological position; it is the perceived gap between the parties that matters, not the 
citizen’s ideological position relative to that gap.4 
                                                 
4 While alienation and polarization are conceptually distinct, scholars have argued that polarization may lead to 
greater alienation over time: Since the citizenry has more or less normally distributed ideological preferences 
(Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope 2006), all else equal, polarizing parties should increase the ideological distance between 
citizens and the parties (King 1997). This increased distance should, in turn, make the median citizen feel more 
estranged, or alienated, from the parties that purport to represent their preferences in government (Craig 1996; King 
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Turning to how ideological alienation should influence trust, alienated citizens should 
feel excluded from the political discourse, leading to distrustful attitudes toward those 
conducting it. More specifically, alienation should estrange citizens from the electoral process; 
alienated citizens should feel excluded from electoral politics because neither party aspires to 
represent their preferences in government. This should generate feelings of process-oriented 
distrust toward government. Alienation should isolate citizens from the day-to-day policymaking 
process as well; it is hard to trust government when you feel that neither party running it 
represents your interests (Downs 1957; Zipp 1985; Dionne 1991; Shea 2003). The farther 
citizens see themselves from a party, the more estranged from the political process they should 
feel. On the other hand, those close to a party should be more likely to trust government since 
they are represented in elections and have a consistent voice in government. Unlike alienated 
citizens, even if their party is not in full control of government institutions, their party’s voice is 
still heard and affects policy through constitutionally designed checks and balances and minority 
party rights in Congress. Thus, the above reasoning allows me to specify my alienation hypothesis: 
all else equal, as a citizen’s ideological distance from the closest party increases, trust should 
decrease. Since I am analyzing individual-level attitudes, I expect alienation to affect trust more 
strongly than polarization since alienation directly relates a citizen’s ideology to the parties’ 
whereas perceived polarization does not take a citizen’s self-placement into consideration. 
 
Models, Data, and Measurement 
My empirical analysis aims to determine whether perceived polarization and ideological 
alienation are meaningful predictors of trust. My theory leads me to anticipate a negative 
relationship between alienation and trust. All else equal, as alienation increases, trust should 
                                                                                                                                                       
1997). However, this paper employs an individual-level analysis which does not assume any particular pattern of 
aggregate over-time change in polarization or alienation. 
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decrease. My theory also predicts a relationship (either negative or positive) between trust and 
polarization. If the data support the alienation and the negative polarization hypotheses, I can 
compare the magnitude of each effect on trust to determine which matters most.  
I employ two statistical models. The first is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
the ANES-constructed 100-point trust composite variable on alienation, polarization, 
presidential and congressional approval, economic prospections and retrospections, partisan 
strength, ideology, and several other control variables. The second model is a logistic regression 
of a binary trust measure on the same variables. The models are specified in equation form as 
follows for each individual i:   
 
Trusti  =  β0 + β1Polarizationi + β2Alienationi + β3Strength of Partisanshipi + 
β4Ideological Self-Placementi + β5Presidential Approvali + β6Congressional Approvali + 
β7Economic Retrospectionsi + β8Economic Prospectionsi + β9Controlsi + εi 
 
I analyze data pooled from the cumulative ANES data file. Since congressional and 
economic performance measures begin in 1980, I am limited to this year as my starting point in 
pooling the data. However, I am able to include every subsequent ANES survey with the 
exception of 2002 -- a year in which the perceived ideology question disappeared, only to return 
in 2004. There are approximately 8,900 observations for each model. I weight the data using the 
ANES-provided post-stratification weights to ensure my sample represents the U.S. population 
as accurately as possible. 
In my first analysis, I use the ANES-constructed trust index as my dependent variable. 
This measure represents a composite of four different ANES measures, each of which is 
mapped onto a 100-point scale, summed, and then divided by the number of valid responses. 
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This result is then rounded to derive each respondent’s trust value.5 These measures ask for 
respondents’ assessments of government wastefulness, corruption, and responsiveness, along 
with an ANES trust item asking respondents how often they can trust government to “do what 
is right.” The index is scaled from 0 for “least trusting” to 100 for “most trusting” with a sample 
mean of 32 (see Appendix A, Table A for descriptive statistics). In Figure 1, I graph the sample 
means across survey years to give the reader a visual feel for the data. Since the dependent 
variable approximates an interval scale, I estimate this model using OLS regression. 
For my second analysis, I use an ANES survey question that was a component of the 
composite variable used in my first analysis, but the only one that directly asks the respondent 
how much he or she trusts government. Generally, political scientists regard this question as the 
best measure of trust available (see Owen and Dennis 2001; Gershtenson 2005). I do this in 
order ensure my results are robust across another prominent trust measure. The variable asks 
respondents how often they can “trust the government in Washington to do what is right.” The 
response categories are scored 1 for “none of the time” (a volunteered response), 2 for “some of 
the time,” 3 for “most of the time,” and 4 for “just about always.” Since 96 percent of the cases 
occur in the two middle categories, I collapse the four categories to form a dichotomous variable 
with a mean of 0.35 (see Appendix A, Table A for descriptive statistics). The sample means 
across survey years are graphed in Figure 2. Since this variable represents a binary outcome, I use 
logistic regression to estimate the model. 
My predictors of interest are perceived polarization and ideological alienation. My analysis is not 
concerned with the objectively “correct” placement of the parties. Rather, citizens’ perceptions 
of party ideological locations are of substantive interest because perceptions should drive 
individual-level trust attitudes. In other words, polarization cannot affect a citizen’s trust in 
                                                 
5 Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.68 which indicates minimally acceptable internal consistency. I include the 
second trust model to overcome any questions about whether my results are robust across trust measures. 
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government if that citizen does not perceive it; citizens form attitudes through a perceptual filter. 
Since the ANES does not measure perceived polarization or ideological alienation directly, I 
derive them from measured variables: Beginning in 1980, the ANES asks respondents for 
ideological placements of both major political parties. Respondents can place the Republican and 
Democratic parties on a seven-point scale ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely 
conservative.” Respondents also place themselves on the same ideological scale. I use these 
responses to construct my measures of alienation and polarization. My perceived polarization 
measure is the absolute difference between each respondent’s placements of the parties on the 
seven-point ideology scale:  
 
 
 
where  represents perceived polarization for each individual i,   is 
the respondent’s perceived ideological position of the Republican Party and is the perceived 
ideological position of the Democratic Party. For example, a respondent who places the 
Democratic Party at “1” (extremely liberal) and the Republican Party at “6” (somewhat 
conservative) would receive a value of “5” on the perceived polarization scale (5 = 16  ). The 
maximum perceived polarization value is 6 (if the respondent sees the parties as polar opposites) 
and the minimum is 0 (if the respondent sees the parties as ideologically equivalent). Appendix, 
Table A displays the descriptive statistics for perceived polarization. Figure 3 displays its 
frequency distribution, which shows that most respondents place the parties between two and 
four ideological units apart. On average, citizens see the parties as 2.79 ideological units apart, 
with a standard deviation of 1.44 units. 
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I measure ideological alienation as the distance between the respondent’s ideological self-
placement and his or her closest party placement. More specifically, this is the minimum 
absolute difference between the respondent’s self-placement and a party placement. It is 
specified in equation form as follows: 
 
 
 
where  represents ideological alienation for each individual i,  is 
respondent i’s ideological self-placement,  is the respondent’s ideological placement of the 
Republican Party, and  is the respondent’s ideological placement of the Democratic Party. The 
respondent was party indifferent (equidistant from each party) in roughly one-fifth of the cases. 
The sample mean of alienation is 0.85 with a standard deviation of 0.80 (see Appendix A, Table 
A for descriptive statistics). Figure 4 displays the frequency distribution for ideological 
alienation, which shows that most respondents place the closest party at or within one 
ideological unit of themselves. Only 51 respondents placed the closest party more than three 
ideological units away.6 Most respondents placed the other party two, three, or four units away 
from themselves. There were only 13 cases in which the respondent’s self-placement and both 
party placements were identical, meaning perceived polarization and ideological alienation both 
equal zero. 
So the reader can get a feel for the macro-level data, I display the biennial survey means 
since 1972 for perceived polarization and ideological alienation in Figure 5. Notice that 
ideological alienation has remained relatively stable since 1972 whereas perceived polarization 
has increased significantly -- by roughly one full ideological unit or 69.4% of perceived 
                                                 
6 Omitting these cases has no significant effect on the regression results (see “Results” section). 
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polarization’s standard deviation. Assuming that the parties in government and as organizations 
have polarized, this suggests that citizens are moving to the poles with their parties. Clearly, 
these trends deserve future macro-level investigation. 
I model several other substantive predictors of trust. First, presidential approval is 
measured on a four-point scale ranging from 1 for “strongly disapprove” to 4 for “strongly 
approve.” Congressional approval is measured as a binary “approve/disapprove” variable. In 
both cases, higher approval should predict higher trust. Since we know economic evaluations 
affect trust, I include the ANES’s five-category measure of economic retrospections, which asks 
respondents to assess the performance of the economy over the past year. The response 
categories range from 1 for “much worse” to 5 for “much better.” Additionally, I include a 
three-category measure of economic prospections scored 1 for “worse,” 2 for “same,” and 3 
for “better.” Rosier economic forecasts and recollections should positively influence trust. 
I also control for strength of partisanship and ideological self-placement. Past research 
shows that party identification is not a significant predictor of trust – on average, Democrats do 
not tend to trust government more than Republicans or vice-a-versa (Keele 2005). However, 
there is evidence that independents trust government less on average than their partisan 
counterparts. Therefore, I model partisanship in terms of strength instead of direction by 
collapsing the ANES party identification scale to 1 for strong partisans, 2 for weak partisans, 3 
for partisan-leaning independents, and 4 for pure independents (non-party-leaning). In terms of 
ideological self-placement, I expect liberals to be more trusting of government, all else equal, 
than conservatives, given liberals’ preference for an active government.7 
                                                 
7 Some scholars argue that ideology measures are biased because many citizens call themselves conservative but are 
operationally liberal (see Stimson 2004). I constructed an alternative ideology measure based on respondents’ 
preferences for government job guarantees similar to Keele (2005). The coefficient was significant in the predicted 
direction but the model fit the data more poorly than the model estimated in this paper. Therefore, I used the 
original ideology measure in my models. 
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In order to account for demographic influences on trust, I include controls for race (1 
for black, 0 for white), gender (1 for female, 0 for male), region (1 for South, 0 for non-South), 
income (quintiles), age (in years), and education level (7-point scale). Based on a large body of 
prior research, we expect these demographic variables to matter in predictable ways.8 For 
example, we would expect respondents from the South to trust the federal government less than 
respondents from the non-South given the South’s historical resistance to federal intervention in 
the states. 
Since I am analyzing pooled cross-sectional data, I anticipate and find post-estimation 
evidence of heteroscedastic residuals. I correct for them using robust standard errors. Also, to 
model changes in the mean of the dependent variable across survey years, I employ year 
dummies (excluded from the tables to save space but reported in Appendix A, Table B). Both 
models are identical with the exception of the estimation method (OLS vs. maximum likelihood) 
and the measurement of the dependent variable. 
 
Results 
The results of the OLS regression analysis displayed in the left-hand column of Table 1 
strongly support the negative polarization hypothesis and the alienation hypothesis -- each 
variable has a significant negative relationship with the composite trust measure. For every one-
unit increase in perceived ideological distance between the parties (perceived polarization), trust 
decreases by 0.51 points on the 100-point scale, all else equal (p < 0.01). Likewise, a one-unit 
increase in ideological distance to the closest party (ideological alienation) lowers trust on 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
8 I omit self-reported unemployment from the models because though King (1997) finds it to be a significant 
predictor of trust, it is statistically insignificant (p = 0.89) when included in my models. I suspect this is because, 
unlike my models, King (1997)’s model does not control for national economic perceptions. 
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average by 1.04 points on the same scale (p < 0.01). Though the alienation coefficient is larger 
than the polarization coefficient, the difference between them does not reach statistical 
significance (p = 0.11, two-tailed). Since a one-unit increase in either polarization or alienation 
may not be realistic given their distributions, we can add further interpretive clarity by putting 
these effects in the context of their standard deviations: A one standard deviation increase in 
polarization (1.44 ideological units) reduces trust by 0.73 points whereas a one standard 
deviation increase in alienation (0.80 ideological units) reduces trust by 0.83 points. Thus, both 
perceived polarization and ideological alienation have a similar statistically significant negative 
effect on trust. 
The other predictors in the OLS model behave as expected.9 Consistent with the 
established literature, congressional approval (β = 9.69, p < 0.01) and presidential approval (β = 
3.09, p < 0.01) are the most powerful predictors of trust. Further, as expected, partisans tend to 
trust government more than non-partisans and conservatives tend to trust government less than 
liberals, all else equal. Economic evaluations play a large role in explaining trust as well: Those 
who felt the economy had improved over the past year and felt it was going to get better in the 
future trusted government more than those who were less rosy about the past economy and less 
optimistic about the future economy.10  
                                                 
9 Hetherington’s (1998) work suggests possible endogeneity concerns with my models. As with any individual-level 
model, causality may flow from my dependent variable (trust) to the predictors. However, my predictors of interest 
-- perceived polarization and ideological alienation -- both make more theoretical sense causally preceding trust than 
being caused by it; in other words, it is difficult to make a compelling theoretical case that one’s trust in government 
should cause ideological placements of the parties and one’s ideological self-placement. Another possibility is that a 
general trust attitude causes perceived polarization, ideological alienation, and trust in government, rendering the 
apparent causal relationship between polarization/alienation and trust spurious. However, there is no commonly 
asked general trust measure in the ANES Cumulative Data File with which to test for spurious causation. 
 
10 Several control variables reached statistical significance in predicted directions as well, though I refrain from 
discussing them here due to space considerations. To assess possible multicolinearity among the predictors, I 
compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each. VIF values for all predictors are well below the threshold for 
multicolinearity concerns. Testing for influential data points among perceived polarization and ideological alienation 
data finds no significant outlier influence on the estimates. 
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To strengthen the robustness of my results, I test a similar model using the more focused 
dichotomous measure of trust described above. The results of this maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation are displayed in the right-hand portion of Table 1. They are similar to those obtained 
using the 100-point trust index as the dependent variable. Though the magnitude of logistic 
regression coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, we can use them to assess the direction 
and significance of relationships. Table 1 shows that perceived polarization and ideological 
alienation each retain their anticipated sign and significance (p < 0.01). Therefore, based on the 
two models’ reinforcing results, I can conclude with confidence that the likelihood of a citizen 
trusting government decreases as perceived polarization and ideological alienation increase. 
Measures of overall model fit indicate a reasonably well-specified model: The McKelvey and 
Zavonia Pseudo-R2 is 0.17 and the model classifies 69.4% of the cases correctly. 
I can further interpret the logistic regression results by looking at predicted probabilities 
of trust at each value of polarization and alienation.11 Table 2 shows the predicted probabilities 
of a trust response across values of polarization and alienation with all other predictors held at 
their means, as well as the 95% confidence interval for each probability. Figures 6 and 7 display 
the same information graphically, with 95% confidence bounds plotted as dotted lines on either 
side of the predicted probability line. For perceived polarization, those placing the parties at the 
same place in ideological space (perceived polarization = 0) have the highest predicted 
probability (0.35) of trusting the government, all else equal. Those with a polarization value of 4 
have a predicted probability of trust that is 0.04 lower (0.31). The predicted probability of trust 
declines monotonically across perceived polarization values – 0.01 per unit increase in 
polarization – such that a minimum to maximum change in polarization reduces the predicated 
probability of trust by 0.06.  
                                                 
11 To compute and analyze predicted probabilities, I use the prvalue command from the SPost add-on to Stata 
written by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese. For more information about this add-on, see Long & Freese (2005). 
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For ideological alienation, the results are more dramatic: Someone whose ideological 
self-placement matches their placement of a political party (alienation = 0) has a 0.35 predicted 
probability of trusting the government, all else equal. However, when alienation is 3, the 
probability of trust drops by 0.07 to 0.28. Again, this relationship is monotonically decreasing, 
with the predicted probability of trust declining by 0.01, 0.02, or 0.03 per unit increase in 
alienation. Taken together, these results suggest meaningful negative impacts on trust as 
polarization and alienation values increase. 
Finally, it would be helpful to compare the magnitude of perceived polarization and 
ideological alienation effects on trust with that of other known trust predictors. To do so, I 
compute discrete changes in the predicted probability of trust for each statistically significant ML 
model predictor reported in Table 1. Table 3 shows the change in predicted probability of trust 
after a one standard deviation increase in each predictor’s value, centered about its mean and 
with all other variables held at their respective means.12 A one standard deviation increase in 
perceived polarization and ideological alienation decreases the predicted probability of trust by 
0.014 and 0.019, respectively. The discrete effects of polarization and alienation on trust are 
similar in absolute magnitude to strength of partisanship (0.019), ideology (-0.018), economic 
retrospections (0.020), and age (0.012). Thus, the explanatory power of perceived polarization 
and ideological alienation is comparable to that of several established trust predictors, though 
not as powerful as presidential and congressional approval. 
To recapitulate, my results show that perceived polarization and ideological alienation 
represent two significant process-oriented predictors of trust that have been studied largely in 
                                                 
12 To analyze change in discrete predicted probabilities, I use the prchange command from the SPost add-on to 
Stata written by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese. For more information about this add-on, see Long & Freese 
(2005). I avoid assessing minimum to maximum effects since the upper categories of alienation contain few 
observations; I do not want to overstate the effects. 
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isolation from the trust literature until this point. When voters feel ideologically alienated by the 
political parties, they tend to trust government significantly less than they would otherwise. 
Perceived ideological distance between the parties is also a significant predictor of trust. 
Therefore, the data strongly support both the negative polarization hypothesis and the alienation 
hypothesis.  
 
Discussion 
It was been several decades since Miller and Citrin debated the significance of political 
trust. Empirically, Citrin appears to have gotten the better of Miller: Performance-oriented 
explanations have dominated the scholarly understanding of what influences trust. So, it would 
appear trust is not a big deal since electoral replacement can easily fix poorly performing 
government leaders. However, this paper’s results give Miller’s side of the debate hope: When 
controlling for performance, the process-oriented variables perceived polarization and 
ideological alienation matter. Unlike ephemeral performance-oriented variables like presidential 
approval and economic retrospections, polarization and alienation both reflect enduring 
institutional characteristics, namely how the parties relate to each other and to citizens in 
ideological space; polarization and alienation cannot be changed quickly or easily through 
electoral replacement. 
Polarization and alienation matter to citizens because they capture how well the parties 
reflect their preferences (alienation) and how effectively the parties in government operate 
(polarization). Citizens who perceive ideologically distant parties may trust government less than 
others because they fear a broken political discourse, an inability to compromise on policy 
decisions, and a lack of legislative productivity. Citizens who find themselves ideologically 
distant from the parties may trust government less than others because they feel alienated from 
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the electoral process, policy debates, and potential policy outcomes. Though polarization and 
alienation are meaningful process-oriented individual-level predictors of trust, there are likely 
others yet to be identified. It could end up being the case that both Miller and Citrin are right if 
new process-oriented variables emerge to balance the performance-oriented factors that 
currently dominate the menu of trust predictors. 
My results suggest that divisive inter-party conflict matters when it comes to explaining 
trust. Political observers’ critical claims that elite polarization creates a divisive political culture 
that turns citizens off to government are well-founded. However, trust is also affected negatively 
by a phenomenon that has received far less scholarly attention: alienation -- the ideological 
chasm between citizens and parties that do not represent their preferences (see Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse 1995; 2001). In short, Downs (1957) is right: ideological proximity matters; 
citizens want parties that reflect their preferences. When citizens’ preferences become distant 
from those who represent them in government, they react by trusting government less to “do 
what is right.” Future research should tap the potential explanatory power of polarization and 
alienation for understanding other barometers of democratic health such as political efficacy and 
party identification rates. 
It is important to emphasize that since I analyze individual-level relationships across 
time, my results are not time-bound – in other words, they do not depend on macro-level 
conditions for their validity. For example, while individual-level alienation may be higher on 
average when the parties in government are polarized (given a citizenry with normally distributed 
ideological preferences), the relationships described in this paper exist independent of macro-
level polarization.13 In fact, alienation can be likely even when the parties are not polarized. For 
                                                 
13 Polarization will often lead to an alienated citizenry, but it need not always do so. For example, if the citizenry is 
polarized, polarizing parties will decrease alienation on average. A macro-level investigation of this topic would be 
helpful in understanding the dynamic relationship between polarization and alienation over time. 
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example, Miller (1974a; 1974b) wrote about alienation at a time when both parties were 
perceived as centrist and out of touch with a comparatively polarized public.  
Though individual-level trust work remains interesting, the long-term consequences of 
process-oriented declines in trust may be best approached from a macro-level perspective. 
Keele’s (2007) work on social capital demonstrates that dynamic causal linkages can help clarify 
our understanding of phenomena like trust. Like social capital, process-oriented effects like 
polarization and alienation have serious and deep-reaching implications for American 
democracy: The absence of trust may create a political climate where elites are unable to avoid 
gridlock. Schattschneider (1960) worried that strong (i.e., polarized) parties might alienate voters 
and, in turn, decrease trust. Polarization- and alienation-induced trust declines might in turn 
trigger mass disengagement from the political process. These defections (especially by 
moderates) could lead to politics dominated by ideologues who initiate a downward spiral by 
alienating more and more members of the citizenry until trust reaches levels that threaten regime 
stability.  
To effectively address Schattschneider’s concerns, scholars must better understand how 
elites and the mass public respond to one another. To the extent that elites lead the citizenry, we 
may observe citizens polarizing in-step with the parties, as the over-time alienation data 
presented in Figure 5 suggest may be happening (Shea 2003; Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz 2006). 
As citizens polarize, they would (on average) become less and less alienated by the closest party. 
Alternatively, parties may respond to lower trust by moving closer to the citizens they are 
alienating. If this is the case, alienation would not be as dangerous as it seems now. What 
ultimately happens speaks to the heart of the performance versus process debate that has 
informed the trust literature. If citizens and parties respond to one another, polarization and 
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alienation may be relatively ephemeral, easily cured diseases. However, if the political process 
reinforces (and hence exacerbates) the problem, the effects could be enduring and damaging.  
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Tables 
Table 1. The Effect of Perceived Polarization and Alienation on Trust, 1980-2004^ 
Predictor OLS Estimate ML Estimate 
Polarization -0.51 
(0.16) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
Alienation -1.04* 
(0.28) 
-0.11* 
(0.03) 
Strength of Partisanship 1.47* 
(0.25) 
0.10* 
(0.03) 
Ideological Self-Placement -0.37* 
(0.16) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
Presidential Approval 3.09* 
(0.21) 
0.31* 
(0.02) 
Congressional Approval 9.69* 
(0.47) 
0.84* 
(0.05) 
Economic Retrospections 1.25* 
(0.26) 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
Economic Prospections 
 
2.82* 
(0.34) 
0.28* 
(0.04) 
Age 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
Black (0/1) -1.17* 
(0.80) 
-0.37* 
(0.09) 
Female (0/1) -1.11* 
(0.44) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
South (0/1) -1.12* 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Income (Quintile) -0.06 
(0.22) 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
Education (1/7) 0.72* 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Constant 
 
7.02* 
(1.69) 
-2.57* 
(0.20) 
R2/McKelvey & Zavoina's R2          0.19 0.17 
  -- -5059.46 
Wald 2  -- 903.83* 
Notes: The dependent variable in the OLS estimation is trust in government measured using the ANES 
trust index scaled from 0 for “least trusting” to 100 for “most trusting.” The dependent variable in the ML 
estimation is trust in government measured using a binary scale of 1 for “trust” and 0 for “do not trust.” 
Table entries are OLS/ML estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies in 
Appendix A, Table B. ANES supplied weights used to ensure data accurately represent population. *p < 
0.05 (two-tailed); N = 8,904 (OLS); N = 8,901 (ML). ^2002 not included.  
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Table 2. Predicted Probabilities of Trust by Polarization and Alienation Values, 1980-
2004^ 
Polarization/Alienation 
Value 
Probability of Trust 
= 1 
for Polarization 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Probability of 
Trust = 1 for 
Alienation 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
0 0.35 0.33-0.38 0.35 0.33-0.36 
1 0.34 0.32-0.36 0.32 0.31-0.33 
2 0.33 0.32-0.35 0.30 0.28-0.32 
3 0.32 0.31-0.33 0.28 0.25-0.30 
4 0.31 0.30-0.33 0.25 0.22-0.29 
5 0.30 0.28-0.32 0.23 0.19-0.28 
6 0.29 0.27-0.32 0.22 0.16-0.27 
Notes: Predicted probabilities calculated using the prvalue command from the SPost add-on package for Stata 
while holding all predictors at their mean (Long & Freese 2005). Predicted probabilities are based on ML estimation 
results in Table 1. ^2002 not included. 
 
 
Table 3. Discrete Change in Predicted Probability of Trust, 1980-2004^ 
Predictor   
Polarization -0.014 
Alienation  -0.019 
Strength of Partisanship 0.019 
Ideological Self-Placement -0.018 
Presidential Approval 0.080 
Congressional Approval 0.090 
Economic Retrospections 0.020 
Economic Prospections 0.044 
Age 0.012 
Black (0/1) -0.024 
Notes: Only statistically significant predictors included. To analyze change in discrete predicted probabilities, I use 
the prchange command from the SPost add-on package for Stata while holding all predictors at their mean 
(Long & Freese 2005). Predicted probabilities are based on ML estimation results in Table 1. ^2002 not included.  
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II. LEFT BEHIND: COMPETITIVE NOMINATIONS AND COMPARATIVE    
CANDIDATE AMBIVALENCE 
 
The 2008 presidential election featured the most competitive Democratic Party nomination 
contest since 1984. Both frontrunners, New York Senator Hillary Clinton and Illinois Senator 
Barack Obama, presented strong candidacies: Clinton attracted key traditional Democratic 
constituencies (working-class whites, seniors, Hispanics, and women) and touted her experience 
advantage over Obama, a relative newcomer to the national political scene. Obama’s support 
base in the primaries consisted of young (under 45 years old), well-educated, affluent, and black 
voters. Throughout the primary and caucus season, prominent Democrats worried about facing 
their first brokered convention since 1984.14 Clinton claimed an overall popular vote lead, 
winning primaries in several delegate-rich states including California, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.15 By the time the final primaries ended in June, Clinton had amassed 1,640 pledged 
delegates to Obama’s 1,763 and 286 superdelegates to Obama’s 395. Obama lacked enough 
pledged delegates to clinch the nomination outright; it was only after a last-minute surge in 
superdelegate commitments that he surpassed the required 2,118 delegates to secure the 
nomination.16 Clinton officially withdrew from the race on June 7. Democrats found themselves 
consolidating support for their nominee against an opponent with a four month head start.
                                                 
14 For example, see Van Natta & Becker (2008). 
 
15 See Healy (2008). Clinton’s claim was criticized as inaccurate because her tally relied on primary results from non-
party sanctioned primaries in Michigan and Florida. Obama was not on the ballot in the Michigan primary. 
 
16 See Zeleny (2008). 
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Competitive nominations like the Democrats experienced in 2008 are purported to 
weaken a party and its nominees by: (1) causing intra-party conflict that divides the party into 
factions; (2) exposing the eventual nominee’s weaknesses that the opposing party can exploit; (3) 
diverting resources from the general election to the nomination campaign; and (4) causing 
disaffected supporters of nomination losers (including activists) to demobilize, defect, or abstain 
from voting for the party nominee on Election Day due to “sour grapes” (see Key 1958; White 
1961; Ranney 1975; Comer 1976; Kirkpatrick 1976; Sullivan 1977-1978; Ware 1979; Polsby & 
Wildavsky 1980; Wayne 1981; Polsby 1983). Political scientists have extensively studied the 
effects of so-called “divisive” nominations on general election behavior across gubernatorial, 
senatorial, and presidential races, using mostly aggregate (state-level) data.17 Some studies find 
that such primaries have negative “carryover effects” on the general election campaign 
(Bernstein 1977; Born 1981; Kenney & Rice 1984; Southwell 1986; Stone 1986; Kenney & Rice 
1987; Lengle, Owen, & Sonner 1995), whereas others find they have insignificant or mixed 
effects (Hacker 1965; Pierson & Smith 1975; Born 1981; Buell 1986; Kenney & Rice 1987; 
Atkeson 1998) or even positive ones (Stone, Atkeson, & Rapoport 1992; Atkeson 1993; Hogan 
2003; Shafer & Wichowsky 2009).  
Most competitive nomination studies that find negative aggregate-level effects loosely 
attribute them to unmeasured individual-level disaffection among thwarted primary voters 
toward their party for failing to nominate their preferred candidate. These “sour grapes” are 
typically assumed to mediate the causal linkage between nomination competitiveness and state-
level general election results. As Ware (1979) points out, this disconnect between individual-level 
                                                 
17 “Divisive primary” analyses typically operationalize divisiveness as the competitiveness of the primary (i.e., 
difference in primary vote share between candidates). However, as Wichowsky & Niebler (2010) point out, the 2008 
Democratic nomination campaign illustrates that a competitive nomination is not necessarily divisive (though 
competitiveness is almost certainly a necessary condition for divisiveness). I suspect that “divisiveness” is a function 
of the level of ideological and policy fissure between the nomination candidates. 
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theory and aggregate-level data makes any causal interpretation tenuous. Individual-level analyses 
have attracted far less scholarly attention (but see Lengle 1980; Southwell 1986; Stone 1986; 
Kenney & Rice 1988; Pierce 2003).18 Notable recent work by Henderson, Hillygus, & Tompson 
(2010) finds that “sour grapes” did not increase the probability of McCain defection among 
Democratic primary voters in 2008. However, the authors operationalize “sour grapes” as a non-
specific “frustrated” response on a checklist of feelings about the upcoming presidential election 
instead of something nomination-specific (524).19 The preponderance of both state- and 
individual-level competitive nomination studies focus on vote choice impacts, potentially 
missing less obvious but equally important impacts on thwarted voters’ attitudes that occur prior 
to Election Day and may provide a necessary causal link to their voting behavior. 
Surprisingly, no studies to date have considered potential competitive nomination 
carryover effects on the attitudes of thwarted voters. In this paper, I argue that thwarted voters 
may be susceptible to increased levels of attitudinal ambivalence toward the general election 
candidates after their preferred candidate (the competitive nomination loser) withdraws from the 
election. Attitudinal ambivalence is not a normal attitude structure – it is an inherently unstable 
state of internal attitude conflict. Attitudinal ambivalence, which has been developed and studied 
in the psychology literature, can be broadly understood as “an individual’s endorsement of 
competing considerations relevant to evaluating an attitude object” (Lavine 2001, 915). In a 
political context, ambivalence occurs when (1) an individual simultaneously holds positive and 
negative attitudes toward the same candidate, party, or policy; or (2) an individual holds positive 
attitudes toward competing candidates, parties, or policies (Lavine 2001; Basinger & Lavine 
                                                 
18 Two of these analyses employ simultaneous equation models in which nomination candidate preference indirectly 
affects vote choice (Kenney & Rice 1988) and participation (Stone 1986) through candidate evaluations. Others 
look at turnout effects (Southwell 1986). 
  
19 Further, the authors fail to purge strategic primary voters from the sample, though they acknowledge their 
presence in it. 
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2005). In order to signify ambivalence, the competing attitudes must be similar in magnitude and 
of at least moderate intensity. Thus, weakly held but conflicting beliefs do not generate sufficient 
conflict to denote ambivalence (Mowrer 1960; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin 1995; Lavine 2001).  
Ambivalence is important because it has meaningful implications for how citizens think 
and behave. It can paralyze a voter’s decision-making process, delaying formation of voting 
intentions and diminish the impact of these intentions on vote choice (Lavine 2001; Alvarez & 
Brehm 2002). Ambivalence makes political attitudes more moderate, less stable, and less 
accessible (Huckfeldt & Sprague 2000; Lavine 2001; Meffert, Guge, & Lodge 2004; Lodge & 
Taber 2005) and partisan attachments and policy judgments more variable (Alvarez & Brehm 
2002; Rudolph 2005; Keele & Wolak 2006). Ambivalence affects the accuracy and processing of 
candidate evaluations, as well as how issues inform them (Lavine 2001; McGraw, Hasecke, and 
Conger 2003; Meffert, Guge, & Lodge 2004; Basinger & Lavine 2005; Craig et al. 2005). These 
effects may result in poorly reasoned voting decisions where the voter ignores competing 
considerations in an effort to avoid the discomfort they cause, instead relying on cues or gut 
feelings. Ambivalence may also discourage political participation (Mutz 2002). However, 
ambivalence also tends to make citizens more deliberative, receptive to new messages, and even-
handed decision makers than their less conflicted counterparts (Sniderman 1981; Guge & 
Meffert 1998; Green, Visser, & Tetlock 2000). Rather than ignorance, ambivalence suggests 
sophisticated multi-dimensional political thinking.   
To date, scholars have largely treated ambivalence as an exogenous variable, focusing on 
its consequences and magnitude as it pertains to issues (e.g., Craig, Kane, & Martinez 2002), 
institutions (e.g., McGraw & Bartels 2005), candidate evaluation (e.g., McGraw, Hasecke, & 
Conger 2003; Meffert, Guge, & Lodge 2004), and partisanship (e.g., Keele & Wolak 2006). 
However, some recent scholarly attention has been devoted to uncovering the underlying 
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sources of ambivalence. This fledgling work finds that partisan and ideological strength 
discourage ambivalence, but exposure to diverse social messages, education, information, and 
need for cognition encourage it (Mutz 2002; Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn 2004; Steenbergen 
& Brewer 2004; Rudolph & Popp 2007). Other work suggests that ambivalent attitudes result 
from value conflict (Alvarez & Brehm 2002; Steenbergen & Brewer 2004; Keele & Wolak 2006), 
affective reactions (Lavine et al. 1998), and group and candidate trait evaluations (Meffert, Guge, 
& Lodge 2004; Lavine & Steenbergen 2005).  
Limited research has attempted to uncover sources of ambivalence during a campaign: 
Keele & Wolak (2008) investigate the effect of state-level campaign context on ambivalence, 
finding that it tends to be higher among residents of battleground states where voters are 
exposed to a greater quantity of conflicting political messages. Only one published paper has 
investigated campaign ambivalence longitudinally: Using the same dataset I use in this paper, 
Rudolph (2011) models ambivalence change over the course of the 2008 presidential campaign, 
though he only makes a first cut at decomposing the sample to examine possible between-group 
heterogeneity.20 While he finds that ambivalence generally declines as the campaign progresses 
and is weaker among devout partisans than dispassionate ones, he does not investigate 
ambivalence as a possible nomination carryover effect.21 Therefore, important work remains to 
be done to determine whether intra-party competition causes ambivalence among thwarted 
voters toward the general election candidates.  
                                                 
20 This was preceded by an unpublished paper (Steenbergen, Lavine, & Goolsby 2006) that used data from two 
ANES panels to study the stability of partisan ambivalence across election years, though the data did not permit 
analysis within a single campaign. 
 
21 He does attempt to examine whether Democrats’ comparative candidate ambivalence toward McCain and Obama 
in the general election campaign was a function of their feelings toward Hillary Clinton and finds that ambivalence 
change among those who liked and disliked Clinton is not distinguishable. However, he restricts his analysis to 
Clinton “likers” instead of Clinton primary/caucus voters. The problem with this is that Clinton “likers” and 
Obama “likers” are not mutually exclusive categories, leaving open the possibility that people who like both Clinton 
and Obama will contaminate the results. 
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This paper assesses whether people who vote for a competitive nomination loser in their 
state’s primary or caucus are more likely than other electoral groups (i.e., independents, other 
partisans, and supporters of nomination winners) to experience ambivalence during the general 
election campaign. Specifically, my analysis investigates comparative candidate ambivalence, which 
entails simultaneously holding positive attitudes toward both general election candidates. Under 
this conception of ambivalence, the more positive an individual’s joint evaluation of the 
candidates, the higher their ambivalence level; the more negative an individual’s joint evaluation 
of the candidates, the lower their ambivalence level; the more univalent an individual’s 
evaluation of the candidates (positive evaluation of one candidate relative to the other), the lower 
their ambivalence level. Comparative candidate ambivalence is a possible carryover effect of 
competitive nominations on thwarted voters. A carryover effect is an impact of a competitive 
nomination contest that uniquely affects thwarted nomination voters’ attitudes or behavior 
during the general election campaign. I refer to comparative candidate ambivalence in this 
context as carryover ambivalence.   
My analysis attempts to determine whether there is evidence of carryover ambivalence 
among thwarted primary or caucus voters. Specifically, I assess whether people who report 
voting for a competitive nomination loser in their state’s primary or caucus are more likely than 
other electoral groups to experience comparative candidate ambivalence during the post-
nomination campaign. Thwarted voters should be more likely than other electoral groups to 
gather positive information about both party nominees during the general election due to (1) 
“sour grapes” toward their party from the nomination campaign; and (2) party-loyalty driven 
pressure to support their party nominee. This influx of positive information about the general 
election candidates should increase comparative candidate ambivalence among thwarted voters 
relative to other groups.   
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In the following sections, I formally develop my theoretical expectations. Then, I derive 
testable hypotheses from these expectations and test them using data from the 2008-09 
American National Election Studies (ANES) Panel Study. Finally, I interpret my results, discuss 
their implications, and offer guidelines for future work. My findings help sharpen the scholarly 
understanding of competitive nomination effects as well as the causes and dynamic 
characteristics of ambivalence during campaigns. 
 
Theoretical Expectations for Comparative Candidate Ambivalence  
This paper investigates comparative candidate ambivalence, which is characterized by 
simultaneously positive evaluations of the general election candidates, as a carryover effect of a 
competitive nomination race. Here, I discuss how motivated reasoning theory underpins my 
theoretical expectations for each level of analysis (cross-sectional and longitudinal) and I use 
these expectations to formalize testable hypotheses. 
 
Cross-Sectional Expectations 
Thwarted voters should be more likely than other electoral groups to experience 
comparative candidate ambivalence during the general election campaign because they are 
uniquely motivated to gather positive information about both parties’ nominees. This motivation 
is best understood in the context of motivated reasoning theory, which argues that people are, in 
large part, motivated by directional goals when gathering and processing information (Kunda 
1990; Lodge & Taber 2000; Redlawsk 2002; Taber & Lodge 2006). These goals cause individuals 
to purposely bias information gathering and processing directionally (positively or negatively). 
Confirmation bias entails disproportionately seeking or accepting information that is consistent 
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with the directional goal. Disconfirmation bias entails avoiding or discounting information that is 
inconsistent with the directional goal.  
Once thwarted voters’ preferred candidate loses the nomination, they should face 
competing directional motivations: First, they should experience residual bitterness, or “sour 
grapes,” about the nomination outcome that motivates them to seek positive (and avoid 
negative) information about -- and even consider voting for -- the opposing party’s candidate in 
the general election. Thwarted voters, who were heavily invested in the nomination loser’s 
candidacy, should be upset at their party for choosing a different candidate. While the 
competitive nomination literature often attributes behavior such as defecting to the opposing 
party or abstaining from voting to “sour grapes” effects, my theory does not require a behavioral 
commitment. Instead, I only expect that thwarted voters will be more likely than other groups to 
gather positive information about the opposing party’s candidate during the general election 
campaign.  
Second, party loyalty pressure should cause thwarted voters to seek positive (and avoid 
negative) information about their party nominee. Competitive nomination battles expose citizens 
to large quantities of candidate information through debates, media coverage, public 
appearances, and advertising (especially in states that hold binding primaries). Candidate loyalty 
represents the salient directional goal during the nomination campaign: loyalists should discount 
negative information (disconfirmation bias) and accept positive information about their 
preferred candidate (confirmation bias), while accepting negative information and discounting 
positive information about opponents. After the nomination campaign ends, thwarted voters 
should possess a negatively biased stockpile of information about the party nominee. During the 
general election campaign, partisan directional goals become salient, motivating thwarted voters 
to gather and internalize positive information about the party nominee.  
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These two competing motivations considered together make thwarted voters more likely 
than other electoral groups to simultaneously hold positive opinions of both candidates during 
the general election campaign and therefore experience comparative candidate ambivalence. 
Since other partisans should not experience a similar change in directional motivation after the 
nomination campaign ends, I expect thwarted voters to have higher comparative candidate 
ambivalence levels than all other partisans, who should be fairly univalent in favor of their party 
nominee. Prior work shows that ambivalence increases as partisan strength decreases (e.g., Keele 
& Wolak 2008), so independents should experience more ambivalence throughout the campaign 
than all other partisans, including thwarted voters. The preceding theoretical development allows 
me to formalize my cross-sectional ambivalence hypothesis: 
During the general election campaign, thwarted voters should experience higher 
average comparative candidate ambivalence than all other electoral groups 
except independents.  
 
Longitudinal Expectations 
Motivated reasoning theory also informs my theoretical expectations about how 
thwarted voters’ comparative candidate ambivalence should change longitudinally over the 
course of the general election campaign relative to other electoral groups. I have no theoretical 
reason to expect discernible ambivalence differences between soon-to-be thwarted voters and 
other electoral groups during the nomination campaign since everyone should be motivated by 
candidate loyalty goals. However, I expect to see a greater positive change in comparative 
candidate ambivalence among thwarted voters than other electoral groups once the losing 
nomination candidate withdraws from the race. After their candidate withdraws, thwarted 
voters’ directional goals should change from candidate loyalty to a competing mixture of “sour 
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grapes” backlash and party loyalty. As discussed above, “sour grapes” should increase the 
tendency for thwarted voters to gather positive information about the opposing party nominee 
whereas party loyalty-driven pressure to re-evaluate the party nominee positively should cause 
thwarted voters to gather positive information about their party nominee. These directional 
pursuits should lead to a rise in positive attitudes toward both party nominees during the general 
election campaign, which, by definition, directly translates to a rise in comparative candidate 
ambivalence.  
I expect greater positive change in comparative candidate ambivalence among thwarted 
voters than other groups since only thwarted voters should experience a change in directional 
motivation when their candidate drops out of the race. Supporters of nomination winners lack 
“sour grapes” motivation to engage in positive information gathering about opposing candidates 
since their preferred candidate remains in the general election race. These voters may seek 
information about the opposing party’s candidate during the general election, but it should be 
subject to heavy disconfirmation and confirmation biases which should polarize their candidate 
evaluations, making them heavily one-sided, or univalent. Unlike thwarted voters, their 
directional goals of candidate-loyalty (during the nomination campaign) and party-loyalty (during 
the general election campaign) reinforce each other. Therefore, I expect nomination winner 
supporters’ mean ambivalence level to decrease relative to thwarted voters’ mean ambivalence 
level during the general election campaign.  
Likewise, partisans who were attached to neither competitive nomination candidate have 
no “sour grapes” motivation to seek positive information about the opposing party nominee. 
However, they are motivated by party loyalty pressure to gather positive information about their 
own party nominee. The net result of their informational pursuit is the accumulation of positive 
information about one candidate but not the other (i.e., univalence), not ambivalence. Therefore, 
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I expect ambivalence to decrease among other partisans relative to thwarted voters during the 
general election campaign. Finally, independents are not subject to partisan directional 
constraints or “sour grapes” effects. Therefore, I do not expect their ambivalence level to 
change significantly during the general election campaign, meaning that thwarted voters’ 
ambivalence should increase relative to independents. 
The preceding discussion allows me to generate a clear testable hypothesis about 
longitudinal ambivalence among thwarted voters: 
Thwarted voters’ ambivalence should increase more than (or decrease less than) 
all other electoral groups during the general election campaign. 
Though I expect comparative candidate ambivalence to rise among thwarted voters 
relative to other groups after their candidate exits the race, I add the caveat that I expect 
thwarted voters’ ambivalence to eventually decline in absolute terms over the course of the 
general election campaign as they digest campaign information into coherent opinions. Cognitive 
dissonance theory tells us that holding positive evaluations of both candidates is not cognitively 
sustainable for the entire campaign. Indeed, it predicts that people should quickly attempt to 
resolve inconsistencies in their belief structure because retaining them causes discomfort 
(Festinger 1957; 1964). We already know that ambivalence generally declines across all 
individuals during the campaign (Rudolph 2011). Therefore, I have theoretical and empirical 
grounds to expect that after an initial rise in comparative candidate ambivalence following 
withdrawal of the competitive nomination loser, thwarted voters’ ambivalence will decline 
somewhat as the general election approaches.  
There is also a somewhat weaker theoretical case supporting the null hypothesis of no 
carryover ambivalence effects. First, party identification is perhaps the most powerful predictor 
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of political attitudes and behavior in the public opinion literature (Campbell et al. 1960). 
Therefore, even seemingly weak partisans may be constrained to such an extent by their 
partisanship that it overcomes any tendency toward ambivalence. Primary and caucus voters 
tend to be particularly devoted partisans, so there may be few thwarted voters in practice who 
are actually weak enough partisans to be susceptible to ambivalence, even if there were 
conditional effects on weak partisans (see Stone, Atkeson, & Rapoport 1992).22 Second, if the 
nomination candidates have similar ideological and policy positions (like Obama and Clinton in 
2008),23 thwarted voters should find it fairly easy to transition their support to the nomination 
winner, especially given party loyalty pressure to do so.24 Findings that confirm this null 
hypothesis would not be in vain since they would provide robust evidence against ambivalence 
as an individual-level competitive nomination carryover effect. 
 
Data and Measures 
To test my hypotheses, I model between-group differences in comparative candidate 
ambivalence during the 2008 presidential campaign. As discussed above, the 2008 Democratic 
nomination featured intense competition between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, making it 
an ideal competitive nomination race with which to test my hypotheses. I use data from the 
2008-09 ANES, which was conducted using two cohorts that participated in up to ten waves 
                                                 
22 Though not tested by the models I report, I test for conditional strength of partisanship effects using a separate 
series of models, footnoted in the “Results” section. 
 
23 Given Clinton and Obama’s perceived ideological and issue stances, Henderson, Hillygus, & Tompson (2010) are 
surprised to find that their ideological differences and position on the Iraq War were the most important predictors 
of a defection to McCain among Democratic primary voters. Though the differences best explain defection to 
McCain, it does not necessarily follow that these differences were particularly large in absolute terms (though 
perhaps Democrats perceived them as such), especially when compared with those between McCain and Obama. 
 
24 In fact, the similarity of the candidates’ ideological and policy preferences probably makes 2008 an especially 
conservative test of my hypotheses. Ideological and policy fissures between candidates might be responsible for 
causing a competitive primary to become “divisive.” In these cases, we would expect carryover ambivalence to be at 
its highest level. 
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beginning in January 2008 (cohort 1) or September 2008 (cohort 2) and ending in August 2009. I 
use cohort 1 data only since my analysis requires pre-September 2008 data. The survey design 
mitigates nomination-winner bias by recording primary or caucus vote choice in the survey wave 
immediately following the respondent’s primary/caucus (see Atkeson 1999). 
Attitude scholars have identified two theoretically necessary and sufficient conditions for 
ambivalence: First, positive and negative reactions to the attitude object must be of similar 
magnitude; dissimilar magnitude indicates univalence (attitudes concentrated at one end of the 
positive-negative spectrum). Second, ambivalence should be a positive function of attitude 
intensity; weakly held attitudes should indicate less internal conflict (e.g., Hass et al. 1991; 
Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin 1995). These conditions are best captured with the ambivalence 
index developed by Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (1995): 
 
 
 
where the ind subscript refers to the level of analysis (individual candidate/party), P captures the 
number of positive reactions to the candidate/party and N captures the number of negative 
reactions. The division by two indicates the average of the number of positive and negative 
reactions, satisfying the intensity criterion. The similarity criterion is met by the absolute value of 
the difference between the number of negative and positive reactions.  
My dependent variable is a measure of comparative candidate ambivalence constructed using 
two survey questions that ask, “Do you like [candidate], dislike [him/her], or neither like nor 
dislike [him/her]?” immediately followed by, “Do you [like/dislike] [him/her] a great deal, a 
moderate amount, or a little?” Though these items are univalent by design and hence do not 
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assess ambivalence toward individual candidates as specified above, they allow me to construct a 
measure of comparative ambivalence toward McCain and Obama. I operationalize this measure 
using an adaptation of the above-described Griffin index first proposed by Lavine (2001) and 
subsequently used by Basinger & Lavine (2005), Rudolph & Popp (2007), Keele & Wolak 
(2008), and Rudolph (2011). Here, the index takes the form:  
 
 
 
where the comp subscript refers to the type of analysis (comparative between McCain and 
Obama), M captures the reaction to John McCain, and O captures the reaction to Barack 
Obama. This formula differs from the original because it compares reaction intensity and 
similarity between candidates instead of positive and negative reactions to a single candidate: Here, 
ambivalence increases as attitudes toward the candidates become less polarized and jointly more 
positive.  Following Rudolph (2011), each reaction is represented by a seven-point scale of 
individual candidate like/dislike generated by combining the two survey items delineated above. 
The scale for M and O ranges from 1 (dislike a great deal) to 7 (like a great deal). The formula 
produces an index with a numerical range of -2 in cases of perfect univalence (e.g., M=7 and 
O=1) to 7 in cases of perfect ambivalence (when M=7 and O=7).25 I use comparative candidate 
ambivalence measured during three survey waves ( , , and ) as 
dependent variables in my cross-sectional models. I use change in comparative candidate 
ambivalence across selected survey waves ( , , and ) 
                                                 
25 Note that under this modified ambivalence formula, simultaneous dislike is not equivalent to simultaneous liking 
(Steenbergen & Brewer 2004; Rudolph 2005). Ambivalence is higher in a condition of simultaneous liking than 
simultaneous disliking. 
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as dependent variables for my three longitudinal models . I report descriptive data for my cross-
sectional dependent variables in Table 4 and longitudinal dependent variables in Table 5. 
  My main predictors of interest are a series of dummy variables representing the following 
electoral groups: Obama primary/caucus voters (hereafter, Obama voters), McCain 
primary/caucus voters (hereafter, McCain voters), other Democratic Party identifiers, other 
Republican Party identifiers, and independents.26 Clinton voters serve as the baseline category in 
order to facilitate intergroup comparisons. I exclude independent and party-bucking primary 
voters from the corresponding nomination candidate voter groups (i.e., Clinton, Obama, 
McCain) and instead classify them according to their party identity because these voters should 
experience ambivalence differently than those who voted for candidates from their own party, 
especially if they were voting strategically (perhaps to thwart a particular candidate).27  
I draw the remaining predictors from the nascent literature on the sources of 
ambivalence (see Rudolph & Popp 2007; Keele & Wolak 2008; Rudolph 2011).28 This literature 
suggests heterogeneous information exposure is a primary cause of ambivalence (Barker & 
Hansen 2005; Rudolph & Popp 2007). Therefore, I include several measures best thought to 
                                                 
26 Due to research suggesting that independent “leaners” (independents who feel closer to one major party than the 
other) tend to behave like partisans, I classify them as partisan identifiers (Keith et al. 1992). Only “pure” 
independents (those who feel closer to neither party) are classified as independents. 
 
27 The data suggest significant strategic voting among Republicans: 55 Republicans voted for Democrats in 
primaries whereas only 16 Democrats voted for Republicans. Eighteen respondents reported a primary or caucus 
vote choice despite having stated previously that they were sure they did not vote in the primary or caucus. These 
cases were placed in the partisan category corresponding to the respondent’s party identification. 
  
28 Unfortunately, there are unavoidable endogeneity issues with my research design. If a choice was available, I 
picked measures from the earliest wave in which it was taken so as to minimize or eliminate these issues. 
Unfortunately, due to the survey design, certain established ambivalence predictors are only measured in survey 
waves that occur after the time period I analyze (e.g., care who wins), thus giving me the undesirable choice between a 
misspecified model and one with possible endogeneity issues. I do not have reason to suspect endogeneity between 
my group dummies and ambivalence since primary voting and party identification measures are taken prior to 
ambivalence measures. 
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capture it: First, I use a five-point measure of educational attainment.29 Highly educated citizens are 
more likely to consume a large quantity of information, think critically about it, and consider 
multiple viewpoints than their less educated counterparts, making them more susceptible to 
ambivalence. Second, following Rudolph (2011), I measure the ability to engage in effortful 
information processing using a seven-point scale of political knowledge constructed from six 
questions about American politics. The variable is scaled from 0 for no questions answered 
correctly to 6 for all questions answered correctly.30 Third, I measure desire to engage in effortful 
processing using a need for cognition scale constructed from the standard ANES two-item battery.31 
Need for cognition has been associated with decreased reliance on informational shortcuts and 
using more complex cognitive processes when thinking about candidates (Cacioppo et al. 1986; 
Ahlering 1987; Condra 1992; Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo 1992). 
My final informational heterogeneity exposure measure is state-level party competition. It 
follows that voters in states with competitive parties should be exposed to greater quantities of 
competing campaign information in the form of advertising, media coverage, and politically 
diverse social interactions than voters in single-party dominated states. Therefore, they should be 
more ambivalent, on average, than those in less competitive states. Following Rudolph (2011), I 
                                                 
29 The 2008-09 ANES Panel Study derives an overall educational attainment variable that categorizes respondents as 
follows: (1) no high school diploma; (2) high school diploma; (3) some college; (4) bachelor’s degree; and (5) 
graduate degree. 
 
30 I use the following wave 2 questions: (1) Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected 
President of the United States under current laws? (2) For how many years is a United States Senator elected – that 
is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator? (3) How many U.S. Senators are there 
from each state? (4) For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives elected – that 
is, how many years are there in one full term for a U.S. House member? (5) According to federal law, if the 
President of the United States dies, is no longer willing or able to serve, or is removed from office by Congress, the 
Vice President would become the President. If the Vice President were unable or unwilling to serve, who would be 
eligible to become president next? (6) What percentage of the vote of the House and Senate is needed to override a 
Presidential veto? 
 
31 This battery includes two questions from wave 11: the first asks if the respondent prefers to solve complex or 
simple problems, the second asks whether the respondent likes to have responsibility for situations that require a 
great deal of thinking. I rescale each from 0 to 1, then average them. 
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measure party competition using 2008 Gallup tracking poll data on shares of Republican and 
Democratic identifiers in each state (and Washington, D.C.). I use these data to compute a state-
level Herfindahl Index, with higher numbers representing states with greater party competition.32  
Next, turning to factors derived from motivated reasoning theory, I account for partisan 
directional goals with a measure of partisan strength, constructed by folding the survey’s seven-
point party identification variable into a four-point scale that ranges from independent to strong 
partisans.33 Finally, I include a five-category measure of whether respondents care who wins the 
general election.34 All else equal, those heavily invested in the election outcome should be more 
likely to recall considerations consistent with their preferred outcome, making them less likely to 
experience ambivalence (Rudolph & Popp 2007). 
Rudolph & Popp (2007) argue that effortful processing should influence ambivalence 
differently among strong partisans than it does among weak partisans: strong partisans’ 
confirmation and disconfirmation biases should make effortful processing result in lower 
ambivalence as it only serves to reinforce their biases. Conversely, weak partisans’ relatively 
stronger accuracy goals should make effortful processing result in greater ambivalence (Millar & 
Tesser 1986). Rudolph & Popp’s (2007) results empirically confirm these divergent expectations. 
Therefore, I incorporate this conditional relationship into my models with the interaction term 
partisan strength x political knowledge. (Here, political knowledge is a proxy for effortful processing.)  
 
                                                 
32 The Herfindahl Index is computed by squaring each party’s share of identifiers within a state, summing these 
squared shares, and then subtracting this sum from 1. 
 
33 Party identification is measured during wave 1 and collapsed to assign 0 for independents, 1 for partisan leaners, 2 
for weak partisans, and 3 for strong partisans. Note that because I only include Democratic Party identifiers in the 
Clinton voter group, my partisan strength measure only contains three strength categories: leaners, weak partisans, 
and strong partisans. 
 
34 The wave 9 survey item reads: “How much do you care who wins the presidential election in November?” 
Response choices are: “A great deal,” “a lot,” “a moderate amount,” “a little,” or “not at all.” 
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Comparative Candidate Ambivalence in the 2008 Presidential Election 
I preface my analysis with a look at comparative ambivalence data across electoral 
groups during the 2008 presidential election campaign. Figure 1 compares Clinton voters’ 
ambivalence mean with those of McCain and Obama voters. The data show that, as expected, 
Clinton voters remain more ambivalent toward McCain and Obama than those who supported 
these candidates in the primaries. Perhaps indicative of the Obama campaign’s relative strength, 
McCain voters’ mean ambivalence rises slightly from June to October, while Obama voters’ 
views toward the candidates polarize steadily; their mean ambivalence declined from 1.34 to 0.87 
(a decrease of about 20% of ’s standard deviation). Clinton voters were significantly 
more ambivalent than Obama voters in September (0.53 or about 21% of ’s standard 
deviation, t-test p < 0.05, two-tailed), which suggests that party loyalty pressure did not 
necessarily compel Clinton voters to fall in line behind Obama after he became the nominee. In 
October, a slightly larger gap (0.56 or 22% of ’s standard deviation, t-test p < 0.05, two-
tailed) remained between the two groups. These data suggest Clinton voters may have 
experienced carryover ambivalence that lasted through Election Day.  
Figure 2 compares Clinton voters to independents and party identifiers who either did 
not vote for a major nomination candidate (Obama, Clinton, or McCain) or did not vote in their 
party primary. As expected, independents’ mean ambivalence levels far exceed those of party 
identifiers throughout the campaign, whereas Clinton voters largely resemble their partisan 
counterparts with the exception of the post-nomination period (June to September), when mean 
ambivalence rises among Clinton voters but declines among other partisans and independents. 
In September, the difference between Clinton voters and other Democrats is 0.26 (or 10% of 
’s standard deviation, t-test ns, two-tailed), though this difference evaporates a month 
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later. However, the jump between June and September suggests a small but ephemeral carryover 
effect worthy of multivariate investigation. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
In order to better understand possible carryover ambivalence among Clinton voters, I 
subject the data to multivariate analysis. I model comparative candidate ambivalence both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally as a function of the variables discussed above. The variables of 
theoretical interest in each model are the electoral group dummies, which compare each group 
to Clinton voters (baseline group). Group dummy coefficient estimates represent the  
or  predicted mean difference between that group and Clinton voters. I also 
compute post-estimation predicted  or  values for each group (with all 
other variables held at their means) along with confidence intervals for these values.  
 
Cross-Sectional Results  
Table 6 reports three identically specified cross-sectional multi-level linear models 
(MLMs) of comparative candidate ambivalence toward McCain and Obama measured during 
each post-nomination survey wave (June, September, and October).35 First, consider the left-
hand column, which depicts the June wave model. None of the group dummy variable 
coefficients is significantly different from the Clinton baseline, indicating that Clinton voters’ 
ambivalence mean is statistically indistinguishable from other groups’ mean once other 
ambivalence predictors are held constant. Turning to the predicted ambivalence group means 
( ) in Table 7, my post-estimation analysis confirms that Clinton voters 
                                                 
35 I use a MLM in order to adequately account for within-state clustering and nonconstant error variance across 
states (Steenbergen & Jones 2002). 
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( ) did not experience particularly high ambivalence in June compared to other 
groups. These results are not surprising because, although Clinton withdrew from the 
nomination race on June 7, there was likely a lag between her withdrawal and the development 
of ambivalence among her supporters because it takes time to gather and process new 
information about the general election campaign. Therefore, I expect ambivalence change not to 
be evident immediately after Clinton withdraws.  
The center column in Table 6 reports the September wave model and Table 8 reports 
the corresponding predicted group ambivalence means ( ). 36 Overall, the data show 
mixed support for my cross-sectional ambivalence hypothesis: Clinton voters showed the 
highest predicted ambivalence mean of all groups ( ), though it was not 
significantly higher than the other groups. Consistent with expectations, the coefficients for 
other Democrats and Republicans are negatively signed and significant, indicating that Clinton 
voters were, on average, more ambivalent than partisans who did not vote for a general election 
candidate in the primaries. Specifically, predicted mean ambivalence for other Democrats is 1.21, 
which is about 0.7 ambivalence scale units lower than that of Clinton voters (about 30% of 
’s standard deviation). Predicted mean ambivalence for other Republicans is 1.54, or 
about 0.4 ambivalence scale units lower than Clinton voters’ (about 15% of ’s standard 
deviation). Though the coefficients are in the hypothesized negative direction, Clinton voters’ 
conditional ambivalence means are not statistically different from Obama (1.64) and McCain 
(1.69) voters’ means, which contradicts my motivated reasoning-driven expectation that these 
groups should be less ambivalent than Clinton voters. I refrain from interpreting the coefficient 
for the independents dummy variable because it was (necessarily) estimated with partisan 
                                                 
36 Rounding error may cause the reported model coefficients to differ slightly from the difference in predicted 
means between groups, but these two pieces of information are equivalent.  
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strength held at its mean value of 1.95, which is an infeasible value for independents who are by 
definition a 0 (independent) on the partisan strength scale. I do, however, estimate the predicted 
mean for independents (1.78), which is slightly less than Clinton voters’ ambivalence mean 
(1.92). This is somewhat surprising given that independents typically have higher ambivalence 
than partisans, but alas, the difference is not statistically significant.  
Turning to the October wave model in the far right column of Table 6 and the 
corresponding predicted group ambivalence means ( ) in Table 9, Clinton voters’ 
predicted mean ambivalence ( ) is, as expected, lower in October than it was in 
September. This decline suggests that Clinton voters’ carryover ambivalence may have resolved 
itself somewhat prior to the election. Though the differences are not statistically significant, 
McCain voters’ (1.80) and independents’ predicted ambivalence means ( ) are 
now higher than Clinton voters’ mean. All other group means remain lower than Clinton voters’ 
mean, but the differences fail to reach statistical significance.  
In sum, my cross-sectional ambivalence hypothesis is not supported: While there is 
limited evidence that Clinton voters are more ambivalent than some groups, particularly in 
September, there is no evidence that they are uniformly more ambivalent than other 
primary/caucus voters, partisans, or independents throughout the general election campaign.37 
Though interesting, cross-sectional differences between groups tell us nothing about how 
Clinton voters’ ambivalence changes relative to other groups during the general election 
campaign. Therefore, I next explore the dynamics of ambivalence over the course of the 
campaign using longitudinal ambivalence models. 
 
                                                 
37 Small group sample sizes may be keeping some groups’ standard errors higher than they would be with more 
observations. Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c report numbers of observations per group for each cross-sectional model. 
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Longitudinal Results 
Table 10 reports the results of three MLMs of comparative candidate ambivalence 
change -- the difference between comparative candidate ambivalence measurements across two 
selected waves: . Since cross-sectional comparative candidate 
ambivalence is measured on a scale ranging from -2 to +7, ambivalence change across waves can 
range from -9 to +9.  The models are specified identically to the cross-sectional models reported 
above with the exception of an added lagged ambivalence measure ( ) that accounts for 
regression to the mean effects.  
The left-hand column of Table 10 reports a model of ambivalence change during the 
nomination campaign ( ) and Table 11 reports the 
corresponding predicted ambivalence mean changes ( ) for each group. Though 
this model does not directly test my longitudinal ambivalence hypothesis, I include it in order to 
determine whether there are group differences in ambivalence change during the nomination 
campaign. If such differences exist, it becomes difficult to attribute post-nomination group 
ambivalence change differences to nomination carryover effects. In this model, none of the 
group dummy coefficients is statistically different from zero, which indicates that changes in 
Clinton voter ambivalence were statistically indistinguishable from those of other electoral 
groups during the campaign’s nomination phase. This null finding makes it plausible that 
subsequent across-wave ambivalence change differences between Clinton voters and other 
groups are attributable to nomination carryover effects, since Clinton’s absence is the only 
substantive difference between the two phases. Looking at Table 11, all groups experience 
ambivalence decay during the nomination campaign, which seems plausible given the high 
amount information processing that necessarily takes place early in a campaign.  
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Next, I model ambivalence change between June and September – the period 
immediately following Clinton’s withdrawal from the Democratic nomination race. The results 
displayed in the center column of Table 10 and the corresponding predicted group ambivalence 
mean changes ( ) depicted in Table 12 provide mixed support for my 
longitudinal ambivalence hypothesis: Clinton voters show the greatest predicted ambivalence 
change of all five groups ( ). The change in group ambivalence means 
for Obama (+0.002) and McCain (+0.24) voters are comparatively smaller, though they are not 
statistically different from that of Clinton voters. Of the remaining three groups, two (other 
Democrats and other Republicans) experience negative ambivalence change with statistically 
significant ambivalence mean differences from Clinton voters. Other Democrats experience an 
ambivalence mean decrease (-0.33) that differs from Clinton voters’ ambivalence mean increase 
by about two-thirds of an ambivalence unit (0.65, or about one-third standard deviation of 
). Other Republicans show ambivalence change of -0.04, a 0.36 unit difference 
from Clinton voters. Independents’ ambivalence group mean change, though negative 
( ), is not statistically different from Clinton voters.  
Finally, I model ambivalence change for the full post-nomination period (June - 
October) in order to determine whether carryover ambivalence might have persisted until 
Election Day and potentially influenced Clinton voters’ electoral decision making. I display 
predicted ambivalence change group means ( ) in Table 13. The data provide 
only limited support for long-lasting carryover effects: Clinton voters 
( ), McCain voters (+0.20), and independents (+0.16) experience 
positive net ambivalence change during the post-nomination period. Obama voters experience 
the greatest decline in predicted ambivalence of all groups (-0.35), followed by other Democrats 
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(-0.25), and other Republicans (-0.02). Turning to the model coefficients reported in the right-
hand column of Table 10, there are statistically significant ambivalence mean differences 
between Clinton and Obama voters (0.46) and between Clinton voters and other Democrats 
(0.36). Thus, during the general election campaign, Clinton voters experienced a greater 
ambivalence increase than three of the five other electoral groups, two of which differences with 
the two other Democratic groups reaching statistical significance. 
To summarize, my results show only meager support for the longitudinal ambivalence 
hypothesis: Clinton voters’ ambivalence mean increases more than any other group between 
June and September, but not all group mean change differences are statistically significant.38 
From June to October, Clinton voters exhibit significantly greater ambivalence change than two 
of the five electoral groups. Moreover, Clinton voters’ ambivalence mean increases over the 
post-nomination campaign phase whereas three of the five other group means decrease. There 
are no discernable intergroup ambivalence change differences during the nomination phase, 
which suggests that the change differences observed during the general election campaign may 
be due to carryover effects. Clinton voters’ increase in ambivalence is greater from June to 
September than from June to October, which indicates that they may have resolved some of it 
prior to Election Day. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Strongly Democratic Clinton primary/caucus voters may be less susceptible to experiencing ambivalence during 
the general election campaign than weakly Democratic Clinton voters, since stronger partisan attachments should 
make them more likely to “fall in line” with the party nominee. I test this by dividing Clinton voters into strong 
Democrats and weak Democrats/independents and re-running my models. I find no statistically significant 
differences between weakly Democratic/independent and strongly Democratic Clinton voters’ ambivalence levels in 
any of my models.   
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Discussion 
This paper uses cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis to ascertain whether 
comparative candidate ambivalence is a plausible carryover effect of a competitive party 
nomination. I do so in the context of the 2008 presidential campaign, which featured a 
competitive Democratic nomination race between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. My 
results are fundamentally constrained by the small group sample sizes in the survey that severely 
limited the precision of my group mean estimates. The evidence, though sparse, suggests 
competitive nominations may increase ambivalence among supporters of nomination losers 
relative to some other electoral groups.  
One potential explanation for my mixed results is the possibility that ambivalence peaked 
among thwarted voters prior to the September survey wave and I am missing more clearly 
defined intergroup differences due to lack of data. Therefore, future campaign panels would 
benefit scholars if they included more frequent surveys with larger sample sizes in order to 
facilitate longitudinal intergroup analyses. Despite the lack of complete and copious data, during 
the general election campaign, thwarted Clinton primary/caucus voters experienced greater 
cross-sectional ambivalence than several groups, but there were no such differences during the 
nomination campaign. Therefore, it is plausible that these differences are the result of carryover 
ambivalence from the competitive nomination, as there is no other structural change in the 
campaign to which these differences could be attributed. Longitudinally, Clinton voters buck the 
overall general election campaign trend of ambivalence decay; their mean ambivalence level 
increases from June to October, whereas it decreases for three of the five other groups. Though 
explaining why ambivalence rose so much among McCain primary/caucus voters is beyond the 
scope of this work, one potential explanation is his relatively weak candidacy compared to 
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Obama’s that may have caused McCain primary/caucus voters to reassess their choice during 
the general election campaign. 
This paper can hardly claim that the competitiveness of the 2008 Democratic 
nomination caused ambivalence among thwarted Clinton voters. Rather, the tenuous evidence is 
merely suggestive of a possible effect worthy of deeper investigation with more robust data. 
Clearly, competitive nominations are not the only possible cause of between-group ambivalence 
differences or changes in ambivalence during campaigns. Other variables may influence group 
differences in ambivalence or the degree to which ambivalence increases or decreases among 
groups during the campaign. For example, as mentioned above, candidate strength may play an 
important moderating role in explaining cross-sectional intergroup ambivalence differences. 
Moreover, contextual factors like negative racial affect toward Barack Obama may have diluted 
(or overstated) cross-sectional group ambivalence differences. Longitudinally, though racial bias 
should be a constant, party pressure to embrace Obama during the general election campaign 
may have triggered ambivalence among racially biased Clinton voters as this pressure conflicted 
with their bias. These ambivalence changes could be wrongly interpreted as competitive 
nomination effects when they are actually racial effects. Fortunately, the 2008-09 ANES Panel 
Study conducts one of the first Implicit Attitude Tests (IAT) on a representative survey sample. 
However, the results have not been coded, making development of a racial affect control 
variable prohibitively time consuming for this paper, but a task for future work.  
 While much prior work has focused on rather nebulous connections between 
competitive nominations and decreased vote share among the party nominee, this is the first 
paper to articulate and theoretically justify a possible within-campaign attitudinal mediator 
(ambivalence) between a competitive nomination race and ensuing behavioral consequences. A 
null result with more plentiful data might put to rest the “sour grapes” arguments scholars have 
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used for decades (but never directly tested) as a post-hoc theoretical explanation for negative 
nomination carryover effects. If competitive nominations indeed induce ambivalence among 
thwarted voters that lasts deep into the campaign or perhaps even through Election Day, the 
implications are consequential as the literature has firmly established ambivalence’s meaningful 
impacts on campaign information processing and, ultimately, electoral behavior (see Lavine 2001 
as the best overall example). Future work should investigate different ambivalence measures, 
particularly single-candidate ambivalence to assess whether robust and far-reaching group 
ambivalence differences exist during campaigns. Also, future work should investigate data from 
several competitive nomination campaigns across national and state offices to determine 
whether results are generalizable or idiosyncratic.  
More broadly, ambivalence scholars should investigate why ambivalence appears to 
decline generally over the course of a campaign and the specific factors that contribute to its 
decay or persistence. We know that a great deal of learning occurs during a campaign, but we do 
not know the mechanism by which this influx of information reduces or increases ambivalence. 
Understanding this mechanism would greatly advance our understanding of the dynamics of 
attitudinal ambivalence during campaigns and the ways in which competitive nominations might 
influence them. 
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Tables 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for , , and  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: σ stands for standard deviation; DV stands for dependent variable; Obs stands for number of observations; 
Min stands for minimum; Max stands for maximum. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for , , and  
DV Obs Mean σ Min Max 
 965 -1.1 2.39 -8 8 
 970 -0.09 1.95 -6.5 -6 
 954 -0.15 2.15 -8 7.5 
Notes: σ stands for standard deviation; DV stands for dependent variable; Obs stands for number of observations; 
Min stands for minimum; Max stands for maximum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV Obs Mean  σ Min Max 
 
970 1.62 2.41 -2 7 
 
1047 1.48 2.49 -2 7 
 
1028 1.46 2.52 -2 7 
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Table 6. Comparative Candidate Ambivalence among Electoral Groups 
    
Group Dummies (Clinton Voter = baseline)    
Obama Voter 0.04 (0.24) -0.28 (0.26) -0.28 (0.24) 
Other Democrat -0.17 (0.24) -0.71* (0.28) -0.32 (0.24) 
McCain Voter  -0.03 (0.25) -0.11 (0.42) 0.11 (0.34) 
Other Republican -0.08 (0.22) -0.37* (0.22) -0.14 (0.22) 
Independent** -0.42 (0.38) -1.18* (0.36) -0.88* (0.35) 
 
Other Predictors 
   
State Partisan Competition -2.52 (3.55) 0.46 (2.53) 2.04 (2.79) 
Partisan Strength -0.36* (0.11) -0.53* (0.11) -0.60* (0.10) 
Political Knowledge 0.09 (.07) 0.08 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06) 
Partisan Strength X Political Knowledge -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.08* (0.04) 
Educational Attainment 0.09 (0.09) 0.17* (0.07) 0.03 (0.09) 
Need for Cognition -0.15 (0.21) -0.12 (0.23) -0.30 (0.19) 
Care Who Wins Election -0.68* (0.06) -0.75* (0.07) -0.73* (0.07) 
Constant 
 
5.94* (2.18) 4.34* (1.52) 3.68* (1.75) 
Variance Components    
Intercept  5.01e-10 (3.91e-9) 1.17e-7 (5.83e-7) 0.002 (0.006) 
Residual 2.24 (0.04) 2.28 (0.03) 2.29 (0.04) 
Number of State-Level Cases 50 50 50 
Number of Individual-Level Cases              970          1047        1028 
Notes: Table entries are multilevel estimates of cross-sectional cross-candidate ambivalence with bootstrap cluster 
standard errors (BCSE) in parentheses.39 *p-value < 0.05, one-tailed. **Not interpreted because this coefficient is 
estimated with partisan strength held at an infeasible mean value (1.95) for independents who, by definition, 
measure 0 (independent) on the partisan strength scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Harden (2011) demonstrates that standard errors tend to be understated in clustered data models due to 
unmodeled within-cluster correlation, including models that employ robust cluster standard errors (RCSE). 
Therefore, I calculate unbiased bootstrap cluster standard errors (BCSE). In order to produce stable standard error 
calculations, I run 500 bootstrap replications per model (see Feng, McLerran, & Grizzle 1996).  
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Table 7. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters 1.72 1.36-2.07 114 
Obama Voters 1.76 1.46-2.05 137 
Other Democrats 1.55 1.26-1.83 174 
McCain Voters 1.69 1.21-2.16 84 
Other Republicans 1.64 1.36-1.92 352 
Independents 2.01 1.61-2.42 109 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
 
Table 8. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters 1.92 1.51-2.32 126 
Obama Voters 1.64 1.34-1.94 149 
Other Democrats 1.21 0.94-1.47 185 
McCain Voters 1.69 1.21-2.16 93 
Other Republicans 1.54 1.32-1.76 379 
Independents 1.78 1.47-2.09 115 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
 
Table 9. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters 1.69 1.34-2.05 125 
Obama Voters 1.41 1.06-1.76 146 
Other Democrats 1.37 1.07-1.67 182 
McCain Voters 1.80 1.12-2.49 91 
Other Republicans 1.55 1.29-1.82 371 
Independents 2.00 1.52-2.47 113 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
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Table 10. Comparative Candidate Ambivalence Change among Electoral Groups 
   
 
 
 Electoral Group Dummies  
(Clinton Voter =baseline) 
   
Obama Voter 0.04 (0.23) -0.32 (0.21) -0.46* (0.20) 
Other Democrat  -0.06 (0.20) -0.65* (0.16) -0.36* (0.15) 
McCain Voter   0.11 (0.23) -0.08  (0.34) 0.09 (0.27) 
Other Republican 0.28 (0.20) -0.36* (0.18) -0.13 (0.18) 
Independent** 
 
-0.11 (0.33) -1.00* (0.29) -0.81* (0.32) 
Controls    
State Partisan Competition    -0.91 (2.15)     2.02 (1.88)     2.49 (2.31) 
Partisan Strength -0.27* (0.10) -0.31*(0.09) -0.44* (0.09) 
Political Knowledge 0.06 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04) -0.09 (0.05) 
Partisan Strength x Political Knowledge -0.04 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) -0.05 (0.03) 
Educational Attainment -0.03 (0.08) 0.10* (0.05) -0.01 (0.06) 
Need for Cognition -0.14 (0.22) -0.08 (0.20) -0.36* (0.17) 
Care Who Wins Election -0.50* (0.05) -0.31* (0.06) -0.34* (0.06) 
Ambivalencet-1  -0.54* (0.03) -0.35* (0.03) -0.43* (0.03) 
Constant 
 
3.15* (1.32) 0.68 (1.18) 0.99 (1.42) 
Variance Components    
Intercept 5.96e-10 (4.65e-9) 1.98e-9 (1.20e-8) 0.12 (0.48) 
Residual 1.98 (0.04) 1.77 (.05) 1.87 (0.04) 
Number of State-Level Cases 50 50 50 
Number of Individual-Level Cases 965 970 954 
Notes: Table entries are multilevel estimates of change in cross-candidate ambivalence with bootstrap cluster 
standard errors (BCSE) in parentheses (500 replications). *p-value < 0.05, one-tailed. **Not interpreted because this 
coefficient is estimated with partisan strength held at an infeasible mean value (1.95) for independents who, by 
definition, measure 0 (independent) on partisan strength scale. 
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Table 11. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters -1.19 -1.52-(-0.87) 114 
Obama Voters -1.15 -1.44-(-0.86) 137 
Other Democrats -1.25 -1.55-(-0.96) 174 
McCain Voters -1.09 -1.45-(-0.72) 83 
Other Republicans -0.91 -1.15-(-0.67) 350 
Independents -0.77 -1.07-(-0.46) 107 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
 
Table 12. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters 0.32 0.04-0.60 114 
Obama Voters 0.002 -0.28-0.29 137 
Other Democrats -0.33 -0.53-(-0.12) 174 
McCain Voters 0.24 -0.36-0.85 84 
Other Republicans -0.04 -0.21-0.13 352 
Independents -0.07 -0.35-0.21 109 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
 
Table 13. Post-Estimation Predicted Group Means of   
Electoral Group 
 
95% CI Obs 
Clinton Voters 0.11 -0.13-0.35 114 
Obama Voters -0.35 -0.66-(-0.04) 134 
Other Democrats -0.25 -0.52-0.02 171 
McCain Voters 0.20 -0.36-0.77 82 
Other Republicans -0.02 -0.25-0.21 345 
Independents 0.16 -0.25-0.58 108 
Notes: Predicted means calculated using Stata’s margins command with control variables held at their means; s.e. 
stands for standard error; 95% CI stands for 95% confidence interval; Obs stands for number of observations. 
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Figures 
 
 
  
 
III. WHO ARE THE SCOREKEEPERS? SOPHISTICATED INDEPENDENTS  
AND ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS  
 
Democratic theory maintains that citizens should behave as rational, objective, and well-
informed information processors. Individual-level behavioral studies have overwhelmingly 
refuted this proposition, concluding that American public opinion is alarmingly ignorant, 
unstable, and disorganized (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). Converse’s seminal 
work characterized public opinion primarily as “non-attitudes.” Even partisans, who are 
ostensibly invested in politics to some degree, have psychological attachments to political parties 
which act as a “perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to 
his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al. 1960, 133). Zaller (1992) developed this idea further, 
suggesting that sophisticated partisans engage in “partisan resistance,” in which they 
counterargue facts that contradict their political opinions. Similarly, political psychology’s 
motivated reasoning theory argues that directional goals such as partisanship often bias 
information processing at the expense of accuracy goals (see Kunda 1990). Empirical work 
demonstrates the tendency for partisans to project their perceptions onto political actors (Brody 
& Page 1972; Martinez 1988), and make biased assessments of political figures (Bartels 2002; 
Goren 2002) and new information (Houston & Fazio 1989).  
As scholarly attention turned to macro-level public opinion, a surprising contradiction 
emerged: when aggregated, public opinion appears remarkably well-informed about and 
responsive to economic and government performance (Kramer 1983; Page & Shapiro 1992; 
Durr 1993; Erikson, Stimson, & MacKuen 2002). The logic that macro-level researchers use to
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 bridge these seemingly discrepant results is rooted in what Stimson (2004) calls “aggregation 
gain” -- the tendency for aggregated data to accentuate systematic over random components. 
For those who do not pay attention to politics, non-attitudes are essentially random opinions. By 
definition, random data sum to zero when aggregated, leaving no net variance over time. 
Similarly, Republican and Democratic Party identifiers exhibit biased opinions in opposite 
directions that, when aggregated, also yield zero net variance (Bartels 2002; Erikson, Stimson & 
MacKuen 2002). This leaves only the well-informed, responsive, and unbiased as drivers of 
aggregate opinion change.40  
While scholars have devoted copious theoretical attention to solving the puzzle of 
exactly who drives public opinion change, empirical analysis to support it is lacking. Converse 
(1990) suggests it is only a small group of citizens who possess the informational acuity of elites. 
Erikson, Stimson, & MacKuen (2002) argue that “when Presidential Approval changes, it is the 
people who are aware of the president’s activity who move.” These citizens “pay attention and 
respond in meaningful ways to political cues” (6-7). The authors go on to propose three models 
of opinion change: The “baseline” model in which change is driven by a randomly distributed 
subset of the electorate, the “opinion elite” model in which change is driven by a small group 
that pays an inordinate amount of attention to politics, and the “peripheral voter” model in 
which the least informed move opinion since they typically are not biased by partisan 
attachments. Using General Social Survey (GSS) data limited by a lack of political variables, the 
authors find weak support for the baseline model: “the better educated move more than others, 
but movement seems to come from all [demographic] strata of American society” (219). 
                                                 
40 This is a somewhat stylized depiction of the theory of aggregation gain. There are several caveats:  Erikson, 
Stimson, & MacKuen (2002) warn that erroneous signals (such as responses to demagoguery) could disrupt the 
randomness assumption. Bartels (1996) and Duch, Palmer, & Anderson (2000) among others empirically 
demonstrate systematic biases in seemingly “random” aggregate data.  
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However, the authors readily concede that education is a crude proxy for political sophistication, 
so their conclusion is preliminary. 
Stimson (2004) develops a more detailed theory of who moves opinion, arguing that a 
group of “nonideological pragmatists” called “scorekeepers” account for “virtually all [public 
opinion] change over time” (164). He differentiates scorekeepers from “the uninvolved,” who 
are uninterested in and uninformed about politics and whose opinions therefore amount to 
random noise, and “the passionate,” who are strongly interested in politics but hold enduring 
partisan commitments that make their opinions fairly constant over time. Scorekeepers care 
solely about outcomes such as peace and prosperity, which allows them to thermostatically 
change their preferences for government spending and taxes as conditions warrant (see Wlezien 
1995). So, over time, scorekeepers may hold both liberal and conservative positions and support 
presidents from both major parties. According to Stimson, scorekeepers have two defining 
characteristics that make them the sole producers of systematic opinion movement: “(1) paying 
enough attention to respond to the common signals of politics (unlike the uninvolved); yet (2) 
not being so involved as to be committed always to one side (unlike the passionate)” (164).41  
This paper attempts to shed some light on one of the most puzzling contradictions 
between macro- and micro-level public opinion studies: the seemingly simultaneous existence of 
individual-level noise and aggregate order. Specifically, I hope to uncover micro-level evidence 
of the coherent signal we see in macro-level studies. It is possible that a single, small, but as of 
yet undefined group of citizens make political opinion appear orderly on the macro-level, while 
belying underlying disorder. The central goal of this paper is to uncover whether this group of 
opinion-movers shares any measurable characteristics. In what follows, I make the case that 
Stimson’s scorekeepers are best operationalized as politically sophisticated independents. These 
                                                 
41 Parentheses and their contents added for clarity. 
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citizens should be the most likely to pay attention to politically relevant information and form 
objective opinions in response. Therefore, we should observe empirically that sophisticated 
independents’ perceptions are closer than any other groups’ perceptions to objective reality. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, I make the case for why Stimson’s scorekeepers 
are best operationalized as sophisticated independents. Then, I divide the citizenry into four 
groups that correspond to Stimson’s: sophisticated independents, unsophisticated independents, 
in-partisans, and out-partisans. Next, I discuss theoretical expectations for each group’s use of 
objective economic data when forming economic retrospections. 
I test these theoretical expectations empirically using data from the 1980-2008 American 
National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File:42 First, I assess baseline economic 
retrospection differences between the four groups mentioned above. Second, my macro-level 
test compares mean retrospections of each group over time. Though I do not have enough time 
series data points for statistical analysis, the results will visually demonstrate which group(s) best 
track longitudinally with the sample mean – an imperfect but necessary (for reasons explained 
later) approximation of true economic conditions. Third, I regress economic retrospections on a 
series of interactions between dummy variables for each group and the previous year’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). This will test how strongly objective economic conditions influence 
economic retrospections for each group. Finally, I discuss my results and their implications for 
future research. If my theoretical expectations hold, the implications are rather peculiar for 
democratic theory: those who tend to behave “correctly” (i.e., make objective judgments using 
full information) in American democracy are precisely those who do not take sides in the 
partisan structure that defines it.  
 
                                                 
42 I must exclude data from 1988 and 2002 for reasons explained in the “Data and Methods” section. There was no 
ANES survey administered in 2006. 
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Who Are The Scorekeepers? 
Building on Stimson’s (2004) framework, I attempt to empirically test his theoretical 
inferences on both the micro and macro levels. Stimson’s scorekeepers have two distinguishing 
characteristics: (1) they pay enough attention to politics to form accurate perceptions of the state 
of the political world; and (2) their perceptions are not biased by attachment to a political party. 
In order to test Stimson’ theory, these characteristics must first be translated into measurable 
attributes. The latter characteristic is fairly straightforward: those without strong party 
attachments are typically considered independents. The former implies that scorekeepers are 
politically sophisticated. So, in the parlance of political science, scorekeepers are sophisticated 
independents. On the surface, this combination of characteristics seems like it would be fairly 
uncommon in the population since most with high political knowledge also have strong partisan 
attachments (Converse 1964). However, macropolitics scholars stress that opinion change that 
moves one party into office at the expense of the other is usually marginal rather than sweeping 
– on the order of a few percentage points. As a result, the size of the group that moves opinion 
need not be large to effect change at the margin; it could be as small as a few percent of voters 
(Erikson, Stimson, & MacKuen 2002; Stimson 2004).  
My analysis aims to determine whether scorekeepers’ opinions track with objective 
reality better than those of Stimson’s two other groups: the “uninvolved” and the “passionate.” 
Following Stimson’s logic, the uninvolved are best described as unsophisticated independents 
because they lack partisan ties (independent) and political information (unsophisticated). 
Partisans embody Stimson’s characterization of the passionate.  
In order to test my theory, I must find a perception that also has an objective reference 
from which to measure “error.” Unfortunately, most attitudes, perceptions, and opinions 
captured in surveys (e.g., preferred level of government spending) lack an objective reference 
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point. However, economic retrospections -- a fundamental influence on electoral decision 
making -- do have a clear reference point from which to measure bias that the mass media 
consistently relay to the public: GDP (Kramer 1983; Nadeau et al. 1999).43 If sophisticated 
independents are behaving as scorekeepers, GDP should inform their economic retrospections 
more than those of other groups. As Stimson (2004) puts it, “the net perception of the 
economy, neither biased nor ignorant, is driven wholly by the scorekeepers” (165). 
 
Expectations for Four Groups 
For purposes of this analysis, I divide the citizenry into four groups: sophisticated 
independents, unsophisticated independents, out-partisans, and in-partisans. I should observe 
clear intergroup differences across three main areas of investigation: (1) groups’ baseline 
economic retrospections; (2) how each group’s retrospections track with mean retrospections 
over time; and, most importantly, (3) the degree to which objective economic conditions inform 
each group’s retrospections. 
 
Partisans 
Campbell et al. (1960) first proposed that partisans see politics through a “perceptual 
screen” that distorts reality in favor of what is consistent with their party orientation. Subsequent 
work suggests that partisans tend to engage in two processes that cause them to bias their 
perceptions: First, they tend to selectively expose themselves to and accept information that 
reinforces their partisan biases (Sears & Freedman 1967; Zaller 1992). Second, motivated 
reasoning theory states that those with directional goals (e.g., partisanship) tend to bias their 
                                                 
43 I chose retrospections over prospections because retrospections are measured when the objective baseline (GDP) 
is already widely known; it is a perception of past performance that is either correct or incorrect at the time of the 
survey instead of a prediction of future performance that has no objective comparison at the time of the survey. 
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opinions in favor of the goal (and at the expense of accuracy) by either ignoring contradictory 
information altogether or attempting to discount it (e.g., Kunda 1990; Lodge & Taber 2000). 
Therefore, I develop the following expectations for partisans: (1) Partisans should exhibit biased 
retrospections compared to independents. Since their party is in power, in-partisans should be 
much more likely than out-partisans and somewhat more likely than sophisticated and 
unsophisticated independents to hold positive retrospections, all else equal. Conversely, since 
their party is not in power, out-partisans should be much more likely than in-partisans and 
somewhat more likely than sophisticated and unsophisticated independents to hold negative 
retrospections, all else equal;44 (2) on the macro level, in-partisans’ mean retrospections should 
be higher than the sample mean over time whereas out-partisans’ retrospections should be lower 
than the sample mean; (3) in-partisans and out-partisans’ retrospections should be less responsive 
to changes in GDP than sophisticated independents’ retrospections. In other words, partisans’ 
retrospections should change at a slower rate as a function of GDP than sophisticated 
independents’ retrospections do. Additionally, partisans’ retrospections should exhibit signs of 
bias in the form of shifted predicted probability graphs relative to sophisticated independents. 
 
Unsophisticated Independents 
Unsophisticated independents face a different situation than partisans; they are not 
biased, but they are also not informed. This leads me to develop the following expectations for 
this group: (1) since they lack directional goals, I do not expect unsophisticated independents’ 
retrospections to be biased. On average, I expect their retrospections to be similar in relation to 
                                                 
44 Empirical evidence to date shows that partisans have distorted economic perceptions. For example, Bartels’ 
(2002) analysis of the 1988 post-Reagan ANES panel study finds that strong Democrats perceived unemployment 
to be higher than it really was whereas Republicans correctly perceived a moderate decline in unemployment during 
the Reagan Administration. More dramatically, inflation declined from 13.5 to 4.1 percent but 50 percent of strong 
Democratic respondents felt that inflation had actually increased and only eight percent of strong Democrats felt 
that inflation had declined. 
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partisans as those of sophisticated independents (see below). While I expect their individual-level 
data to be less objectively accurate, I do not expect to find evidence of systematic bias in the 
group retrospection means;45 (2) on the macro level, I expect unsophisticated independents to 
have retrospections that track fairly closely with sample mean retrospections. Though their 
individual-level retrospections should be more randomly distributed across the survey responses 
or perhaps modally concentrated at a response such as “about the same,” once aggregated, the 
randomness should cancel, leaving behind a fairly accurate signal from the small subset of 
unsophisticated independents who somehow manage to pick up on the overall state of the 
economy; (3) though ostensibly motivated by accuracy goals, unsophisticated independents lack 
sufficient information to form objective perceptions, at least most of the time. Thus, GDP 
should poorly predict unsophisticated independents’ retrospections relative to sophisticated 
independents. In other words, like partisans, unsophisticated independents should be less 
responsive to changes in GDP than their sophisticated counterparts.  
 
Sophisticated Independents 
Sophisticated independents lack partisan bias and therefore should be motivated solely 
by accuracy goals. Unlike unsophisticated independents, they possess enough political 
information to reliably achieve them. As a result, I generate the following expectations for 
sophisticated independents: (1) sophisticated independents should hold unbiased retrospections 
-- that is, they should be more likely than out-partisans and less likely than in-partisans to hold 
positive retrospections, all else equal. Symmetrically, sophisticated independents should be more 
                                                 
45 It is highly unlikely that all unsophisticated independents are uninformed about the state of the economy. The 
theory of aggregation gain tells us that it only requires a handful of unsophisticated independents who stay informed 
about the economy to make the group mean appear to be in-step with economic conditions. Uninformed opinions 
are random and therefore cancel when aggregated, leaving a “signal” driven by the few who pay attention to 
economic conditions. 
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likely than in-partisans and less likely than out-partisans to hold negative retrospections, all else 
equal; (2) since I anticipate that sophisticated independents hold unbiased retrospections, on the 
macro level, their retrospections mean should track more closely with the sample mean than 
partisans’ retrospections; it should be consistently lower than in-partisans’ mean and higher than 
out-partisans’ mean across time; (3) economic retrospections should be more responsive to 
GDP for sophisticated independents than for any other group. 
 
A Note about Expectations 
It is important that I do not overstate my theoretical expectations. For example, it would 
be unreasonable to expect that only sophisticated independents use GDP to form retrospections. 
Kunda (1990) cautions that motivated reasoning bias is limited by one’s ability to reasonably 
justify it. While the partisan motive is strong, it is not absolute; accuracy goals still exist to some 
degree for even the strongest partisans to minimize the cognitive dissonance from holding 
opinions inconsistent with reality (see Festinger 1957). So, when the economy moves 
overwhelmingly in one direction, partisans should find it increasingly difficult to maintain their 
biased opinions and adjust their perceptions to be somewhat more accurate in response. Also, 
despite any partisan’s best efforts to only consume information that suits them, it is difficult to 
avoid objective economic data altogether (Zaller 1992). Empirically consistent with Kunda’s 
(1990) and Zaller’s (1992) theories, Gerber & Green (1999) and Page & Shapiro (1992) 
demonstrate that citizens exhibit parallel opinion change across partisan and demographic 
groups. That is to say, all groups respond to some degree to economic data but the magnitude of 
that response may vary across groups. Therefore, we should expect some Bayesian updating 
among even the most die-hard partisans, who should have some desire to maintain a roughly 
accurate perception of their party’s stewardship of the economy to avoid sounding delusional 
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(Achen 1989; 1992; Gerber & Green 1999), especially given that objective economic conditions 
are widely disseminated by the media (Nadeau et al. 1999). As a result, my theory prescribes no 
absolutes, only differences in degree -- we should see the most accurate and responsive 
perceptions among sophisticated independents. 
Likewise, it is not reasonable to assume that the entire group of unsophisticated 
independents is unaware of national economic health. In other words, my sophistication 
measure is not going to perfectly segregate those who perceive the state of the objective 
economy from those who do not. As we know from macro-level opinion change theory, only a 
small responsive subset is necessary to make a group signal appear orderly. Therefore, I do not 
expect to see noisy aggregate data from unsophisticated independents. Instead, the primary 
distinction between my theoretical expectations for unsophisticated and sophisticated 
independents’ retrospections is that the former should be demonstrably less responsive to GDP 
changes than the latter. 
 
Data and Methods 
My analysis uses pooled data from the ANES Cumulative Data File for federal election 
years from 1980 to 2008.46 My dependent variable for my micro-level analyses is the five-point 
ordinal economic retrospections scale, which asks respondents to rate the performance of the 
economy over the past year as either “much worse,” “somewhat worse,” “about the same,” 
“somewhat better,” or “much better” than the previous year.47 Since this is an ordinal scale, both 
                                                 
46 I omit 1988 data because there were no post-interview information ratings in that year’s survey. Year 2002 data 
are omitted due to insufficient income data. There was no ANES survey administered in 2006. 
 
47 The question reads: “Now thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that as 
compared to a year ago, the nation’s economy is better, about the same, or worse?” Respondents who choose either 
“better” or “worse” are asked to further specify the degree. 
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of my micro-level analyses use ordered probit models estimated with maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
I construct my four categories of respondents as follows: The ANES seven-point party 
identification scale asks respondents to classify themselves as either strong or weak partisans or 
as an independent. Interviewers then ask respondents who identify themselves as independents 
to state whether they feel closer to one of the major parties and if so, which party. This results in 
three types of independents: Republican-leaning, Democrat-leaning, and pure independent. I 
transform this party identification scale into a measure of partisan strength by folding “strong” 
Republicans and Democrats into one category, “weak” partisans and partisan-leaning 
independents into another, and pure independents into a third. I classify partisan-leaning 
independents as partisans because of research suggesting leaners’ behavior is statistically 
indistinguishable from weak partisans (Keith et al. 1992). Since independent leaners can be 
expected to exhibit partisan bias, it would be unwise to consider them candidates to be 
scorekeepers.48  
After separating the sample by strength of partisanship, I next control for presidential in-
party status among partisans, creating categories for in-partisans and out-partisans. Consistent 
with motivated reasoning theory (see Kunda 1990) and selective information exposure (Zaller 
1992), I anticipate significant in-party/out-party effects on economic retrospections (Kinder and 
Mebane 1983). Specifically, in-partisans’ economic assessments should be biased in favor of the 
incumbent and out-partisans’ economic assessments should be biased in favor of the out-party.  
Finally, I divide independents by sophistication level. Scholars have heavily debated 
sophistication both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, the consensus is that 
sophistication is the degree of cognitive complexity in one’s thinking about politics. 
                                                 
48 Though, by necessity, I must regrettably renege on this decision for my macro-level analysis. 
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Operationally, this implies a high level of political knowledge (both factual and conceptual), 
awareness, and interest (Zaller 1992). For my purposes, political knowledge appears to be most 
germane, since scorekeepers have to be reasonably informed on the state of the economy to 
produce accurate perceptions. Though economic growth is not political information per se, it is, 
as Bartels (2002) calls it, “politically relevant” since it informs citizens’ political attitudes and 
behavior. Often, researchers build composite measures using several political information recall 
questions (e.g. “Who is the Chief Justice of the United States?”). However, the ANES 
Cumulative Data File does not contain many recall questions and the ones it does contain are 
limited to only a handful of survey years. Therefore, like much prior research, I choose to 
measure sophistication using the interviewer assessment of the respondent’s level of political 
information.49  
I chose the interviewer assessment for two reasons: First, Zaller (1985) concludes that it 
is a “highly effective” sophistication measure due to its high reliability and low bias compared to 
more complicated information scales (17-18). This is not surprising since the interviewer 
ostensibly takes into account all information from the interview in formulating a placement, 
including information not captured in the survey data. Second, the descriptive data do not 
support Gomez and Wilson’s (2001) claim that the interviewer assessment suffers from “the 
fatal defect of insufficient variance” (904, footnote 4). On the contrary, the dispersion of the 
data (σ = 1.05) indicates that they contain meaningful variation. Gomez and Wilson’s (2001) 
                                                 
49 Since my sophistication measure is a subjective interviewer assessment, I test for biased assessments of two 
groups that have historically faced discrimination – blacks and women. First, I compare the sophistication mean for 
black respondents when the interviewer is white with the mean when the interviewer is black. Second, I compare 
the sophistication mean for female respondents when the interviewer is male with the mean when the interviewer is 
female. The model also controls for respondent-reported education level. The sophistication mean for white 
interviewers and black respondents is lower (-0.35, p < 0.05) than the mean for black interviewers and black 
respondents. The sophistication mean for male interviewers and female respondents is higher (0.20, p < 0.05) than 
the mean for female interviewers and female respondents. It is impossible to know if true bias exists or what 
direction it takes since there is no objective baseline with which to compare the assessments. For example, it could 
be the case that black interviewers are biasing their assessments of black respondents positively.  However, these 
results suggest further investigation is in order. 
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claim that there is a tendency to call “all but the most exceptional respondents ‘average’” (904, 
footnote 4) does not square with the distribution of the actual data (see Appendix B, Figure A) 
in which 11% of respondents are coded as having very high information, 6.6% as very low, 
19.7% as low, 25.2% as high, and 37.6% as average. 
The interviewer assessment classifies respondents’ level of political information as “very 
high,” “high,” “average,” “low,” or “very low.” I label respondents in the “very high” and 
“high” categories as “sophisticated” and those “average” and below as “unsophisticated.” I label 
the two highest categories as “sophisticated” because: (1) Zaller (1985) finds that interviewers 
have the weakest discriminatory power between these two categories, so they likely overlap 
somewhat; and (2) Stimson (2004) posits that scorekeepers need only be “reasonably well 
informed.” Thus, a sophisticated independent would seem to require merely a “high” level of 
political information and not a “very high” level. Controlling for sophistication gives me four 
groups of respondents included in my model as dummy variables: sophisticated independents 
(baseline category; 2.4% of sample), unsophisticated independents (9.1% of sample), in-partisans 
(41.6% of sample), and out-partisans (46.9% of sample).  
My analysis consists of three parts. First, I use an ordered probit model to test whether 
there are statistically significant group differences in economic retrospections and whether these 
differences are in the theoretically expected direction. Comparatively speaking, in-partisans 
should have the most positive retrospections of all groups, out-partisans should have the most 
negative retrospections and independents should be between the two, all else equal. I account 
for year clustering in the data by (1) allowing the year intercepts to vary (year dummies); and (2) 
cluster-correcting the standard errors for the year clusters. Following Conover, Feldman & 
Knight (1986), I include a series of demographic predictors of economic retrospections: race, 
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gender, education level, family income, age, and region.50 I also include employment status since 
unemployed citizens should be more likely to evaluate the economy negatively, all else equal. To 
ensure that my sample represents the population as accurately as possible, I weight the data 
using ANES-provided post-stratification weights. 
Next, I complement my micro-level group analysis with a macro-level group analysis that 
charts how closely each group’s mean economic retrospections track with the overall sample 
mean over time.51 For each survey year, I take each group’s mean economic retrospection value 
and graph it along with that year’s overall survey mean. Unlike the micro-level analysis described 
above, this one gives the reader a visual comparison of retrospection group means and how they 
change over time. While I do not have enough aggregate data to perform a time series 
regression, I can visually and numerically assess the degree to which each group’s perceptions 
deviate from the sample mean and determine whether there are statistically significant 
differences between group means at each survey year data point. To recapitulate my theoretical 
expectations, I should see independents (both sophisticated and unsophisticated) follow the 
sample mean retrospection most closely. In-partisans should be positively biased and out-
partisans should be negatively biased relative to the sample mean.  
There are two caveats to my macro analysis. The first is that the sample mean likely does 
not capture truly “objective” economic retrospections. As Bartels (1996) and Duch, Palmer, & 
Anderson (2000) show, there are often systematic biases in data that persist when it is 
                                                 
50 There are no explicit expectations behind these demographic controls; I am including them because they were 
included as controls in Conover, Feldman, & Knight (1986), which attempted to determine factors that shape 
economic retrospections. 
 
51 Mapping GDP data onto the retrospections scale using predicted values after regressing retrospections on GDP 
appears at first glance to be a good way to uncover “objective” retrospections to facilitate group comparisons. 
However, GDP does not accurately transfer to the retrospections scale due to biases in the distribution of 
retrospection responses: retrospections are consistently negatively biased such that the maximum sample mean (in a 
year with 3.7 percent GDP growth) is 3.26, which is between the “stayed the same” and “somewhat better” 
responses. Therefore, I use the sample mean retrospection as a representation of the aggregate “signal” on 
economic retrospections. 
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aggregated. For example, Democrats may outnumber Republicans in the sample (and by 
extension, the population) such that their perceptual bias disproportionately influences the 
aggregate retrospection mean relative to Republicans – in other words, partisan bias may not 
sum to zero when opinion data are aggregated across all respondents. Though the sample mean 
may be biased, it does capture the aggregate retrospection “signal,” making it a suitable, if 
imperfect, baseline for comparing group retrospection means.  
The second is that the sophisticated independents sample size is exceedingly small in 
most years -- averaging 38 respondents per survey year, but some have samples under 30.52 This 
gives me unacceptably low confidence that the sophisticated independents sample mean 
accurately captures the group population mean and makes the population mean estimate 
susceptible to outlier effects. Since my longitudinal group comparisons rely on the sample mean 
accurately reflecting the population mean for each group, I must broaden my definition of 
independents to include partisan leaning-independents for purposes of this analysis. These 
respondents answer the initial party identification question with “independent,” but identify a 
major party to which they identify with more closely than the other. Though less than ideal 
(given previously mentioned research demonstrating that leaners behave much like partisans), 
this change will give me a large enough sample to guarantee accurate group means without 
compromising the core definitions of the groups. 
My third analysis tests for group differences in how objective economic information 
conditions retrospections. To capture objective economic performance over the past year, I use 
annual percent change in GDP data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis because it is widely accepted as the strongest measure of the United States’ 
                                                 
52 These numbers represent about 2-3% of each survey’s sample. Assuming unbiased sampling practices, this means 
the percentage of sophisticated independent in the U.S. population is about 2-3%, which is consistent with 
Stimson’s theory that only a small percentage of the overall population effects change at the margins.  
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overall economic health. The annual percent change in GDP (or GDP growth rate) is computed 
by dividing the current year’s inflation-adjusted GDP (in dollars) by the previous year’s GDP. 
Since the ANES surveys that compose the Cumulative Data File are typically administered 
during the fourth quarter of the survey year, I use the GDP annual percent change value for 
each survey year to predict retrospections of that year’s economy.53 I expect the past year’s GDP 
growth rate (hereafter, GDP) to predict sophisticated independents’ retrospections better than 
all other groups’ retrospections.54  
My primary variables of interest are interactions between each group dummy variable 
and GDP. These interactions will reveal the degree to which yearly GDP conditions economic 
retrospections for each group. I display my model results in a table accompanied by a series of 
graphs to visually depict how each group’s predicted probability of choosing three retrospection 
responses changes across GDP levels. If the data support my theoretical expectations, I should 
observe more steeply sloped predicted probability lines across GDP values for sophisticated 
independents than for other groups. Steep lines indicate sharper responsiveness to objective 
conditions than flatter ones. More precisely, steep lines indicate that predicted probabilities of a 
given retrospection change more quickly as a function of GDP than flatter lines. Since GDP 
growth is a yearly measure that by definition only varies by survey year, it will perfectly correlate 
with year dummies if these are included in this model, making it unidentified. As a result, I 
choose to include GDP and drop the year dummies since GDP is my primary year-to-year 
variable of interest. This also allows me to construct predicted probabilities for retrospections 
                                                 
53 Since the survey is usually administered during Q4 of the survey year, one might suspect that annualized data 
from Q4 of the year prior to the survey year through Q3 of the survey year would correlate better with 
retrospections than survey year GDP. After testing this, I found that it did not; yearly GDP growth correlated best 
with retrospections. 
 
54 The annual GDP growth rate is computed by dividing the current year’s GDP (in dollars) by the previous year’s 
GDP.  
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across GDP levels. Like my other micro-level analysis, I use standard errors cluster-corrected for 
the year clusters, ANES post-stratification weighting, and the same set of demographic controls. 
 
Micro-Level Group Economic Retrospection Differences 
First, I assess whether there are discernable group differences in economic 
retrospections. The results displayed in the left-hand column of Table 14 strongly support my 
theoretical expectations: Presidential in-partisans show a statistically significant mean economic 
retrospection difference (0.29) with sophisticated independents. Also, as expected, out-partisans’ 
retrospection mean is significantly lower (-0.24) than that of sophisticated independents. In sum, 
in-partisans view the economy more positively and out-partisans more negatively, on average, 
than sophisticated independents.55 As expected, unsophisticated independents and sophisticated 
independents do not have statistically significant differences in their retrospections.  
To more completely interpret these nonlinear results, I compute predicted probabilities 
across retrospection categories for each group, holding all other group dummies at 0 and all 
other predictors at their means.56 I expect out-partisans to have significantly higher predicted 
probabilities of negative retrospections (i.e., “much worse,” “worse”) than in-partisans and 
sophisticated/unsophisticated independents, though I expect the differences to be greatest 
between out- and in-partisans. Likewise, I expect in-partisans to have significantly higher 
predicted probabilities of positive retrospections (i.e., “much better,” “somewhat better,” and 
                                                 
55 This effect increases with stronger party ties. In a model that separates partisans by strength of partisanship, the 
coefficient is greater for strong in-partisans (.51) than other in-partisans (.23). Similarly, the coefficient for strong 
out-partisans is of greater absolute value (-.35) than for other out-partisans (-.14). 
 
56 Predicted probabilities computed using the prvalue command from the SPost add-on package for Stata (see 
Long & Freese 2005). 
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“about the same”)57 than out-partisans and sophisticated/unsophisticated independents, with the 
largest differences again between out- and in-partisans. I do not expect to find any systematic 
difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated independents’ retrospections since 
unsophisticated independents should have no directional bias to pull their retrospection 
probabilities away from their sophisticated counterparts. Table 15 reports the predicted 
probabilities for each group and Table 16 reports between-group predicted probability 
differences. As expected, out-partisans and in-partisans demonstrate statistically significant 
differences across all but one retrospection category and all differences are in the expected 
direction relative to each positive/negative category. For example, in-partisans have a 0.13 lower 
predicted probability than out-partisans of choosing the “much worse” retrospection (0.11 vs. 
0.24, p < 0.05) and a 0.10 higher predicted probability of choosing the “somewhat better” 
response (0.20 vs. 0.10, p < 0.05).  
Sophisticated independents’ predicted probabilities differ from out-partisans’ in the 
predicted directions across all retrospection categories, with these differences reaching statistical 
significance in two of the five categories: the probability of an “about the same” retrospection is 
0.04 lower among out-partisans (0.32 vs. 0.36, p < 0.05) and the probability of a “somewhat 
better” retrospection is 0.04 lower (0.10 vs. 0.14, p < 0.05). Similarly, sophisticated independents’ 
predicted probabilities differ from in-partisans’ in the predicted direction across all retrospection 
categories as well, with two of the five differences reaching statistical significance. In-partisans’ 
predicted probability of a “much worse” retrospection is 0.06 lower than sophisticated 
independents’ (0.11 vs. 0.18, p < 0.05). Consistent with directional predictions, in-partisans also 
                                                 
57 The sampling distribution of economic retrospections indicates that citizens tend to be pessimistic about 
economic performance, all else equal. Though “about the same” would seem to indicate a neutral response, the 
descriptive data indicate that the distribution of responses is negatively skewed (see Appendix B, Figure B); the 
“much better” response is a seldom chosen fringe category (4.3 percent of the distribution). Thus, the “about the 
same” response tends to reflect a slightly positive retrospection. 
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have a 0.06 higher probability than sophisticated independents of selecting “somewhat better” 
(0.20 vs. 0.14, p < 0.05). However, in-partisans are careful not to distort reality too much, with 
only a 0.02 greater predicted probability of choosing “much better” (0.03 vs. 0.01, ns) than 
sophisticated independents.  
Also as expected, sophisticated and unsophisticated independents show nearly identical 
predicted probabilities for each retrospection category. The magnitude and direction of 
predicted probability differences between sophisticated independents and partisans support the 
contention that independents possess objective retrospections – or at least retrospections that 
are in the middle of the gap between in- and out-partisans. This preliminary analysis gives me a 
good indication that groups may formulate their retrospections differently – notably, that 
partisans possess biased retrospections relative to independents.58 Next, I investigate group 
retrospections from a macro perspective. 
 
Macro-Level Analysis of Economic Retrospection Group Means 
Though the preceding analysis suggests important differences between the retrospections 
of sophisticated independents, unsophisticated independents, and partisans, it does not give us a 
visual perspective on these differences nor does it describe differences in the groups’ mean 
retrospections over time. I display the time series for each group’s retrospection means in several 
graphs (Figures 10-13) with solid lines representing the sample means and broken lines around 
                                                 
58 While differences between sophisticated independents and other groups are, for the most part, not statistically 
significant, it would probably be unrealistic to expect these group differences to be significant in every retrospection 
category since the response to the retrospection question is zero-sum – group differences reflect merely a tendency 
for one group to shift responses toward one end of the scale or the other relative to another group. In other words, 
some in-partisans who would otherwise choose “somewhat worse” choose “about the same” due to their partisan 
bias, but this may not be enough to create a statistically significant difference in the predicted probability of this 
category with another group, particularly if would-be “much worse” retrospections also shift to “somewhat worse” 
to replace those that shifted to “about the same.” 
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them denoting their 95% confidence interval. Lines whose boundaries do not overlap signify 
significant differences between group and sample means. 
 Recall that the fundamental expectation of Stimson’s theory is that partisans should 
exhibit biased retrospections across time. Figures 10 and 11 show that this expectation is 
supported by the macro-level data: the means for in-partisans remain higher than the sample 
mean throughout the series and the out-partisan means remain lower. Thus, in-partisans are 
consistently more positive about the economy than the sample mean and out-partisans 
consistently more negative. The confidence interval lines show that, for the most part, these 
differences are statistically significant. Stimson’s theory posits that these partisan biases should 
roughly cancel one another. In order to test the theory, I look at each group’s absolute deviation 
from the sample mean in each survey year and sum these across the time series to form a “total 
deviation score.” The higher this score, the more the group deviated from the sample mean 
retrospection. To prevent a large deviation or two from skewing my results, I use the mean 
absolute deviation from the sample mean to compare across groups.  
The data depicted in Table 17 show that in-partisans exhibit greater cumulative bias 
(3.72) from the sample mean than out-partisans (2.90). Additionally, in-partisans show slightly 
more bias on average (.29) than out-partisans (.22). While in-partisans and out-partisans exhibit 
consistently biased retrospections over time, the biases do not cancel one another when 
aggregated. Instead, consistent with my micro-level results, there is a net positive longitudinal in-
partisan bias. Rather than indicating greater in-partisan than out-partisan bias, this disparity may 
be due to the fact that out-partisans disproportionately influence the sample mean since they 
make up a greater share (47%) relative to in-partisans (42%) of the total sample used to compute 
it. However, assuming my sample represents the U.S. population, the sample mean is supposed 
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to indicate the true retrospection “signal.” Therefore, Stimson’s theory of symmetrical partisan 
bias is not fully supported by the data – it appears some bias persists in the aggregate data.  
According to my theory, both sophisticated and unsophisticated independents’ 
retrospection means should mirror the sample mean better than the other groups. 
Unsophisticated independents’ retrospections should be more random on the individual-level 
than sophisticated independents’ retrospections (perhaps more modal or more dispersed, 
depending on the survey question), but not systematically biased either positively or negatively. 
As expected, Figure 12 shows that sophisticated independents’ retrospection means track the 
sample mean fairly well as the two lines overlap considerably. Statistically significant differences 
between the two series only occur in three of the 13 survey years: 1984, 1990, and 1994. 
Likewise, Figure 13 shows that unsophisticated independents’ retrospection means also appear 
to match the sample mean retrospection much more closely than their partisan counterparts and 
slightly more closely than sophisticated independents. Unsophisticated independents’ 
retrospection means only show statistically significant differences from the sample mean in 1984 
(barely) and 1994. Table 17 shows that sophisticated independents actually have a slightly higher 
total absolute deviation score (1.50) than unsophisticated independents (1.33) and a slightly 
higher mean absolute deviation score (0.12) than their unsophisticated counterparts (0.10). With 
this perspective in mind, I now turn to whether partisan bias or a lack of information limits the 
degree to which economic growth rates condition retrospections. 
 
Intergroup Differences in How GDP Conditions Economic Retrospections 
In order to assess whether sophisticated independents evaluate the economy more 
objectively than other groups, I introduce a second model featuring interactions between prior-
year GDP and each group dummy variable (again using sophisticated independents as the 
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baseline group). My results are displayed in the right-hand column of Table 14. The reported 
interaction coefficients cannot be directly interpreted in non-linear models such as this because 
they are conditional on the values of the other independents variables (see Ai & Norton 2003; 
Ai, Wang, & Norton 2006). Therefore, to correctly interpret them, I graph the predicted 
probabilities of three retrospection response categories (“somewhat better,” “somewhat worse,” 
and “about the same”) across a range of feasible GDP values. These graphs provide a visual 
depiction of how each group’s retrospection mean responds to changes in GDP. In each graph, 
the y-axis depicts the predicted probability of the response category and the x-axis depicts GDP 
values from -4% growth to 8% growth, plotted at half-percent intervals. To help visualize 
statistically significant group differences, 95% confidence interval boundaries are denoted by two 
broken lines around each predicted probability line. Lines whose boundaries do not overlap 
signify significant between-group differences in predicted probability at a given GDP level.  
These interaction graphs help me test two major theoretical expectations: (1) that 
sophisticated independents’ retrospections should be more responsive to GDP growth levels than 
all other groups. This means that the predicted probability lines for sophisticated independents 
should be more steeply sloped than those of all other groups across all levels of GDP; and (2) 
that partisans’ retrospections should show signs of bias across GDP growth levels in the 
expected direction. In terms of the graphs, this means that in-partisans’ predicted probability 
peaks for each retrospection should occur at lower GDP levels than they do for sophisticated 
independents and out-partisans’ probability peaks should occur at higher GDP levels than they 
do for sophisticated independents. This essentially amounts to a leftward (in-partisans) or 
rightward shift (out-partisans) in the predicted probability distribution relative to sophisticated 
independents. Figure C in Appendix B visually illustrates both responsiveness and bias. 
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Figures 14, 15, and 16 compare predicted probabilities for sophisticated independents’ 
retrospections with those of in-partisans, conditioned on GDP growth. Following the lines for 
each group from left to right in Figure 14, we see a markedly steeper predicted probability line 
slope for sophisticated independents -- clear evidence of sharper responsiveness to GDP as it 
increases along the x-axis. The same general pattern is evident in Figures 15 and 16 -- the rise in 
predicted probability of a “somewhat better” (Figure 15) and “about the same” (Figure 16) 
response is more gradual for in-partisans (moving left to right in the figure) than it is for 
sophisticated independents, which indicates that their retrospections respond more sharply to 
change in GDP.  
The predicted probability graphs highlight several notable statistically significant 
intergroup differences: Figure 15 shows that in-partisans are significantly more likely than 
sophisticated independents to choose the “somewhat better” retrospection when GDP growth 
is below 3.0% (generally considered below average growth), indicating the in-partisan tendency 
to see the economy as rosier than it actually is. Similarly, Figure 16 shows that in-partisans are 
much more likely than sophisticated independents to say the economy is “about the same” when 
it is actually contracting (GDP < 0).  
In terms of bias, in-partisans’ predicted probabilities peak at lower GDP growth levels 
than sophisticated independents’ probabilities in two of the three analyzed retrospection 
categories (“somewhat worse” and “about the same”). For example, in Figure 14, the predicted 
probability of a “somewhat worse” retrospection peaks at a GDP growth rate between -0.5% 
and 0%. For sophisticated independents, this probability peaks when GDP growth is about 2%, 
indicating that in-partisans have a distorted perception of what constitutes “somewhat worse” 
economic performance. In sum, the “partisan screen” imparts an unresponsive and skewed 
interpretation of economic conditions for in-partisans relative to sophisticated independents. 
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Next, Figures 17, 18, and 19 compare sophisticated independents’ retrospections with 
those of out-partisans. Out-partisans present a similar comparative picture to in-partisans: their 
predicted probability lines for all three retrospection categories are noticeably less steep than 
those of sophisticated independents, indicating less responsiveness to GDP. In Figure 17, the 
predicted probability line for sophisticated independents resembles a parabola with a fairly well-
defined peak where GDP = 2%, whereas the line for out-partisans has a markedly smaller slope. 
This poor responsiveness to GDP among out-partisans results in a particularly small range of 
predicted probabilities for the “somewhat worse” retrospection category -- about 0.15-0.32, as 
opposed to about 0.01-0.32 for independents. Figures 18 and 19 compare the same groups for 
the “somewhat better” and “about the same” retrospection categories respectively. This time, 
the predicted probability line slopes indicate that out-partisans are more responsive than they 
were in Figure 17, but still less responsive than sophisticated independents. 
Like in-partisans discussed above, out-partisans’ flatter probability lines result in 
statistically significant predicted probability differences with sophisticated independents: For 
example, the statistically significant separation between the groups’ predicted probability lines in 
Figure 18 indicates that out-partisans are significantly more reluctant than sophisticated 
independents to call an economy with greater than 3% economic growth “somewhat better.” 
Similarly, Figure 17 shows that out-partisans are significantly more likely than sophisticated 
independents to report the economy as “somewhat worse” when growth rates are at 5% or 
greater.  
In terms of bias, out-partisans’ predicted probabilities peak at higher GDP levels than 
sophisticated independents’ probabilities for two of the three analyzed retrospection categories 
(“somewhat better” and “about the same”).59 For example, in Figure 19, the predicted 
                                                 
59 Since some of the peaks occur outside of the feasible GDP range, they may not be visible in the figures presented. 
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probability of an “about the same” response peaks at about 6.5% GDP growth whereas for 
sophisticated independents, the peak is around 4% GDP growth. In contrast to sophisticated 
independents, out-partisans exhibit biased retrospections that are less responsive to objective 
economic conditions.  
My theoretical expectations specify that the line depicting predicted probabilities across 
levels of GDP should be significantly steeper for sophisticated independents than for 
unsophisticated independents, indicating higher responsiveness to GDP in forming 
retrospections. The data presented in Figures 20, 21, and 22 support my expectations: 
sophisticated independents’ predicted probability line is significantly steeper than 
unsophisticated independents’ line across GDP values for all three retrospection categories. For 
example, in Figure 22, the predicted probability line for sophisticated independents rise and falls 
sharply in comparison to the line for unsophisticated independents, which shows a much more 
gradual rise across GDP levels. Thus, unsophisticated independents are less responsive to GDP 
and hence incorporate it less than sophisticated independents do when forming their 
retrospections. Rather than being attributable to a “partisan screen,” differences in 
responsiveness between these groups are solely a function of higher sophistication – the only 
substantive difference between them.  
The sharper responsiveness of sophisticated independents relative to unsophisticated 
independents creates statistically significant differences between the two groups’ retrospection 
probabilities at various GDP levels. For example, in Figure 21, once GDP reaches about 4% 
annual growth (generally considered fairly strong growth), sophisticated independents become 
significantly more likely than unsophisticated independents to give the “somewhat better” 
retrospection, suggesting they are more in tune with actual economic conditions. Conversely, 
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when GDP growth is below about 2.5% (generally considered fairly weak growth),60 
unsophisticated independents are significantly more likely than sophisticated independents to 
choose the “somewhat better” response, indicating that actual GDP growth influences 
unsophisticated independents’ retrospections less than those of sophisticated independents. 
Similarly, Figure 22 shows that unsophisticated independents are significantly more likely than 
sophisticated independents to erroneously report that the economy stayed “about the same” at 
negative GDP levels, which, by definition, indicate that the economy worsened over the past 
year.  
It is also important to note that unsophisticated independents’ predicted probability lines 
closely resemble those of out-partisans: though some peaks occur outside of the feasible range 
of GDP values, like out-partisans, they appear to occur at higher GDP levels than they do for 
sophisticated independents in two of the three analyzed retrospection categories (“somewhat 
better” and “about the same”), indicating negatively biased retrospections. Thus, it is possible 
that unsophisticated independents take economic cues from out-partisans rather than evaluating 
objective data – though the data presented in the first micro-level model do not show any 
statistically significant group differences between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
independents’ retrospections.  
 
Discussion: The Elusive Scorekeepers 
Unlike partisans who filter their perceptions through a “partisan screen” and 
unsophisticated independents who are information-deficient, sophisticated independents 
represent the unique characteristic of highly informed non-partisanship that perfectly matches 
the profile of Stimson’s scorekeepers. Stimson suggests this group is likely very small – on the 
                                                 
60 Most economists agree that 2-3% economic growth is considered marginal because it is just enough to keep up 
with inflation and population growth. 
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order of a few percent of the population. Indeed, sophisticated independents comprised only 2.4 
percent of my sample. My empirical results confirm my theoretical expectations about how 
sophisticated independents should form economic retrospections compared to other groups: 
They use objective economic information the way Stimson’s theory specifies “scorekeepers” 
should; their economic retrospections are more responsive to changes in GDP than any other 
group’s retrospections. On both the micro and macro levels, sophisticated independents’ 
retrospections fall between those of in- and out- partisans, suggesting that they report balanced 
economic evaluations.  
Though I did not expect sophisticated and unsophisticated independents to exhibit 
systematic differences in mean retrospections on either the micro or macro levels, the lack of 
distinction between these groups in my results might lead scholars to question whether 
sophistication is a worthy distinction to make among independents. My GDP interaction results 
make the case for why it is: they clearly show that unsophisticated independents do not use 
GDP to inform their retrospections to the same degree that sophisticated independents do; 
when we analyze individual retrospection categories across levels of GDP, we see a clear 
difference in how sophisticated and unsophisticated independents formulate their 
retrospections. Since we are ultimately interested in how citizens form opinions about the 
economy, the sophistication distinction is indeed a worthy one. More work is necessary to 
ascertain the structure of unsophisticated independents’ individual-level attitudes and the degree 
to which they engage in cue-taking that overcomes their informational deficiency. It is possible 
that unsophisticated independents’ opinions are not truly random as Stimson (2004) proposes, 
particularly if this group takes cues from more informed groups. 
If scorekeepers are readily identifiable through measurable characteristics (i.e., level of 
political information and lack of party identification), we will have taken a large step toward 
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bridging the paradox between micro- and macro-level political research findings which 
simultaneously assert that macro-level attitudes are systematic and orderly, but micro-level 
attitudes are not. The scorekeepers are important because they drive change in public opinion 
over time; they are a group of attentive and pragmatic, yet party-agnostic citizens who may be 
entirely responsible for overcoming what was once believed to be a damning individual-level 
empirical observation that Americans in large measure do not pay enough attention to politics to 
form intelligent political opinions. Future work should investigate whether there are other 
measurable characteristics of scorekeepers that can help us understand who they are and how 
they operate even more precisely. Though Stimson cautions that this group probably changes 
over time, there may still be characteristics that allow us to identify who scorekeepers are at any 
given moment. Future work should also investigate sophisticated independents on the macro-
level to see if their opinions truly drive opinion dynamics. What ultimately remains to be 
determined is whether political scientists can normatively accept the idea that those who shape 
public opinion are a very small subset of the population who are not invested in the parties that 
structure politics. 
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Tables 
Table 14. Group Differences in Retrospective Economic Evaluations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Table entries are maximum likelihood ordered probit estimates with year cluster-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. In order to ensure a representative sample, data are weighted using ANES-provided post-stratification 
weights. N=17,090. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed). Model 1 baseline year=2008. Data from 1988 are omitted because there 
is no post-election interview information assessment. Data from 2002 are omitted due to insufficient income data. 
Year dummies omitted in Model 2 due to perfect colinearity between GDP and year dummies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor Model 1 Model 2 
Sophisticated Independent Baseline Baseline 
Unsophisticated Independent -0.05(0.08) 0.73*(0.26) 
In-Partisan 0.29*(0.09) 0.88*(0.21) 
Out-Partisan -0.24*(0.09) 0.52(0.19) 
GDP -- 0.43*(0.10) 
Unsophisticated Independent X GDP -- -0.24*(0.09) 
In-Partisan X GDP -- -0.17*(0.07) 
Out-Partisan X GDP -- -0.23*(0.06) 
Education 0.03(0.02) 0.03(0.02) 
South 0.08*(0.04) 0.08(0.04) 
Unemployed -0.22*(0.03) -0.26*(0.04) 
Income 0.02(0.02) 0.02(0.02) 
Black -0.15(0.06) -0.14*(0.06) 
Male 0.18*(0.03) 0.17*(0.03) 
1982 0.43*(0.01) -- 
1984 1.65*(0.04) -- 
1986 1.26*(0.03) -- 
1990 0.37*(0.01) -- 
1992 0.27*(0.01) -- 
1994 1.42*(0.04) -- 
1996 1.59*(0.04) -- 
1998 1.83*(0.05) -- 
2000 1.62*(0.04) -- 
2004 1.05*(0.03) -- 
2008 -0.48*(0.02) -- 
Cut-Point 1 (τ1) 0.23(0.13) 0.68(.29) 
Cut-Point 2 (τ2) 1.13(0.11) 1.49(0.26) 
Cut-Point 3 (τ3) 2.18(0.12) 2.46(0.29) 
Cut-Point 4 (τ4) 3.34(0.17) 3.57(0.33) 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.16 0.11 
Log-Pseudolikelihood -21509.58 -22736.15 
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Table 15. Predicted Probabilities of Retrospection Categories by Group 
Economic 
Retrospection 
Category 
Sophisticated 
Independents 
Unsophisticated 
Independents 
In-Partisans Out-Partisans 
1=“much worse” 0.17 0.19 0.11  0.24  
2=“somewhat worse” 0.31 0.32 0.26  0.34  
3= “about the same” 0.36 0.35 0.39  0.32  
4 = “somewhat better” 0.14 0.13 0.20  0.10  
5 = “much better” 0.01 0.01 0.03  0.01  
Notes: Table entries are predicted probabilities of each economic retrospection category (displayed in the left-hand 
column) computed using the prvalue command from the SPost add-on package for Stata (Long & Freese 
2005). When computing each group’s predicted probabilities, all other group dummies are held at 0 and all other 
predictors are held at their means. Predicted probabilities may not sum to 1 within groups due to rounding error. 
 
 
Table 16. Group Differences in Predicted Probabilities of Retrospection Categories 
Economic 
Retrospection 
Category 
In-Partisans & 
Out-Partisans 
Unsophisticated 
Independents & 
Sophisticated 
Independents 
In-Partisans 
& 
Sophisticated 
Independents 
Out-Partisans 
& 
Sophisticated 
Independents 
1=“much worse” -0.13* +0.01 -0.06*  +0.07 
2=“somewhat worse” -0.08 +0.01 -0.05  +0.03 
3= “about the same” +0.08* -0.01 +0.03  -0.04* 
4 = “somewhat better” +0.11* +0.01 +0.06*  -0.04* 
5 = “much better” +0.02* +0.00 +0.02  -0.01 
Notes: Table entries are between-group differences in the predicted probabilities reported in Table 15 for each 
economic retrospection category (displayed in the left-hand column). Predicted probabilities and their confidence 
intervals computed using the prvalue command from the SPost add-on package for Stata (Long & Freese 
2005). The direction (sign) of the group differences is given moving from second-listed group to the first-listed 
group. When computing each group’s predicted probabilities, all other group dummies are held at 0 and all other 
predictors are held at their means. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 17. Group Deviations from Overall Sample Mean 
Notes: Total deviation is the sum of all absolute deviations from the sample mean across all survey years. Mean 
deviation is the mean absolute deviation from the sample mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Sophisticated  
Independents 
Unsophisticated 
Independents 
In-Partisans Out-
Partisans 
1980 -0.12 0.01 0.12 -0.16 
1982 0.05 0.05 0.40 -0.25 
1984 0.25 -0.15 0.55 -0.44 
1986 0.13 0.01 0.24 -0.19 
1990 -0.22 0.01 0.07 0.00 
1992 0.07 -0.08 0.35 -0.21 
1994 0.33 -0.21 0.15 -0.11 
1996 0.08 -0.20 0.24 -0.21 
1998 0.04 -0.06 0.14 -0.16 
2000 -0.16 -0.10 0.34 -0.26 
2002 0.01 -0.08 0.25 -0.21 
2004 0.04 -0.25 0.73 -0.58 
2008 -0.02 0.11 0.14 -0.12 
Total Deviation 1.50 1.33 3.72 2.90 
Mean Deviation 0.12 0.10 0.29 0.22 
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APPENDICIES 
 
Appendix A. Supplementary Material for Chapter I. 
 
Table A. Dependent/Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Trust (100-point index) 8,904 32.29 21.85 0 100 
Trust (dichotomous) 8,901 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Perceived Polarization* 8,904 2.79 1.44 0 6 
Ideological Alienation* 8,904 0.85 0.80 0 6 
Notes: The 100-point trust index is composed of four ANES questions that measure (1) perceived corruption in 
government; (2) perceived wastefulness of government spending; (3) perception of big interests controlling 
government; (4) overall trust in government. The binary trust measure codes 0 as “none/only some of the time” 
and 1 as “most of the time/just about always.” *These variables were not calculated for the 2002 ANES because 
their ancillary questions were not asked. Their descriptive statistics are identical for both model samples. 
 
 
Table B. Year Dummy Coefficient Estimates for Table 1^ 
Year Dummy OLS Estimate ML Estimate 
1980 Baseline Baseline 
1982 1.35 
(1.16) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
1984 4.20* 
(1.12) 
0.40* 
(0.13) 
1986 16.54* 
(1.16) 
0.33* 
(0.14) 
1988 3.03* 
(1.10) 
0.39* 
(0.13) 
1990 1.05 
(1.05) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
1992 1.22 
(0.97) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
1994 
 
-2.64* 
(1.10) 
-0.51* 
(0.15) 
1996 -0.46 
(1.15) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
1998 1.87 
(1.26) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
2000 5.92* 
(1.48) 
0.47* 
(0.17) 
2004 6.56* 
(1.21) 
0.66* 
(0.15) 
Notes: The dependent variable in the OLS estimation is trust in government measured using the ANES trust index 
scaled from 0 for “least trusting” to 100 for “most trusting.” The dependent variable in the ML estimation is trust in 
government measured using a binary scale of 1 for “trust” and 0 for “do not trust.” Table entries are OLS/ML 
estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Full model in Table 1. ANES supplied weights used to ensure 
data accurately represent population. *p < 0.05 (two-tailed); N = 8,904 (OLS); N = 8,901 (ML). ^2002 not included.  
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Appendix B. Supplementary Material for Chapter III. 
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